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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to study the history and challenges in bilateral relations between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan beginning from early 1990s. It aims at increasing our 
understanding about differences in state policies of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and 
the reasons that caused disagreements between the leadership of two states.  The 
focus was on disagreement over two oilfields in the Caspian Sea, which have stalled 
for many years the development of cooperation in other fields as well. I also reviewed 
the historical, economic and political background of the Caspian Sea while analyzing 
political and security issues of the region. Lack of agreement over the legal status of 
the Caspian Sea prevents active economic cooperation between the littoral states and 
serves as a destabilizing factor in the region. A qualitative research method allowed 
me to analyze several questions by using both primary and secondary resources 
during the research. A well-organized research plan helps reader to better understand 
the dynamics of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan relations and different aspects of 
political and economic situations of the Caspian Sea region. The research also draw 
attention to the steps toward the realization of the EU energy goals in the region, by 
increasing European political power. 
The result did not support the expectations of the solution of two state’s dispute will 
be in near future.  However, it is better for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to negotiate 
than to block relations because, otherwise, both states will lose the chance to develop 
their energy resources and infrastructure.  The paper ends with a conclusion and a 
bibliography. The findings may be useful for readers or researchers who are 
interested in Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan bilateral relations, their dispute over oilfields, 
Caspian Sea legal status, energy projects, security challenges in the Caspian Sea 
region and the interests of the regional powers, such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, as well 
as the USA and EU, in this region. 
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Literature review 
The Caspian States are stepping into global stage. Morten, Pavel, Bjorn, Indra and 
Stina investigated the global politics and future energy security by three scenarios. 
First, is economic competition that is important in world domination? According to 
the second scenario, the world is dominated by resource nationalism and geopolitical 
rivalry. The last is about the global shift from carbon-based to low-carbon energy 
sources. The Caspian Sea is a great legal and political phenomenon. Its evolution has 
influence on not only the littoral states but also the international community. Barbara 
Janusz and Pawletta attempt to identify the consequent uncertainty of the Caspian 
states about the extent to their sovereign rights. The uncertainty and lack of the 
Caspian legal status prevent economic development and destabilize political situation 
in the region. Yusin Lee claimed that the disputes over the Caspian Sea legal status 
began after the collapse of Soviet Union. After independence, in 1997, Niyazov, 
former Turkmenistan president, accused Azerbaijan of illegally exploiting the Azeri 
and Chirag oilfields. Anar Valiyev argues that Turkmenistan keeps close ties with 
Russia, while Azerbaijan is more open to the West and if both states continue to 
threaten each other to enter into new conflict, then both will lose the chance to get 
benefits from cooperation. However, the author did not suggest the solution for of the 
settlement of this dispute in the future.  
      Several serious studies have been conducted in order to better understand the 
complexities of the Caspian region. Shirin Akiner focused on the struggle for political 
influence particularly over the legal status of the Caspian Sea and routes for export 
pipelines. His aim was not the repetition of previous arguments concerning the legal 
status but to demonstrate how the same “facts” can be understood in different ways. 
The intention was to provide different regional views, from the countries that 
involved in development of the Caspian basin. It is important to understand these 
different perceptions because they inform us about the decision-making environment. 
The author did not advance a subjective interpretation of events though. According to 
Michael and Bulent since the breakup of the Soviet Union, there has been a great 
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attention on the energy resources of the Caspian Sea. Russia began to experience 
growing difficulties in dealing with regional challenges after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The opening of the Caspian Sea basin to the international community 
produced major contest for access to the energy resources of the region. Russia, 
Turkey and Iran, as well as the United States struggled to exploit the Caspian oil.  
Vladimir and Otar tried to make a critical review of different aspects of political and 
economic development in Russia and other post-Soviet nations in the concept of the 
resource curse. Main questions in their research were the mechanisms and 
consequences of the oil and gas factors that influenced the development, as well as 
state building, rule of law, democracy and foreign policy. Other questions were: how 
the crises of 2008-2009 influenced the oil nations of post-Soviet Eurasia? Authors 
also summarized the analysis of answers of states of post-Soviet Eurasia to present 
the results of studies concerning the different aspects of the problems. 
Sébastien in his work first focused on the historical legacy that Turkmenistan 
inherited a desert territory, crossroads of great empires, extremely varied cultural 
influence, Soviet colonial past and Soviet modernity, which shaped the Turkmen 
nation, its borders and its national identity. The second part of the research 
investigates the technologies of power set up in 1999 in Turkmenistan. The third part 
focuses on dilemmas and security challenges facing Turkmenistan. Implementation of 
a service economy, agrarian reforms, revival of education and healthcare system 
constitute main elements of human security in Turkmenistan. However, according to 
the research, the authorities responded to these challenges slowly. 
Bahman tried to review the geographic, historical and economic backgrounds of the 
Caspian Sea. Gennady analyzed the economic, political, and security issues 
throughout the region after the breakup of the Soviet Union and come to the 
conclusion that the Caspian Sea region remains a conflict zone and an area of 
instability for the future as well.  However, the international community has interest 
to control these tendencies, opening the door to cooperation between the USA and 
Russia.  The research contains valuable data on military spending and main trends in 
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arm purchase by regional governments on region energy resources and biological 
resources of the Caspian Sea.  
Tunc claims that, not only Turkey but other regional powers also have own interests 
in relations with the new independent republics. Today, Turkey and Iran are 
becoming important factors in the economic development of new independent states 
in their relations with Russia. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the exploring 
of oil and attract Europe to the Central Asia and Caucasus. The aim of his research is 
to provide information about the future place of the Black Sea region in twenty first 
century. 
According to Kamyar, if the past of Caspian Sea guide to its future, the division of 
seabed will not be determined so much by legal arguments but by the geostrategic 
and political concerns of the littoral states. He claims that, there is a great game with 
different players and new rules over Caspian energy resources and reserves. 
Aleksandr argues that the expanses of the oceans and seas are subdivided under the 
sovereignty of states. His research offer a well- organized, cohesive account of 
developments and helps reader better to understand the problems of international 
organizations and states to regulate legal status of coastal waters. First, the author 
addressed Soviet approaches, to the law of the sea.  The Soviet Union became a sea 
power by the mid-1060s. But, the scene has changed in the third millennium the 
merchant fleet was divided and sold among the former republics of the USSR.  His 
work is based on the conviction that the treaties are part of the international law. It 
addresses an important component of the international legal system and Russian 
foreign relations law.  
David and Lee offers us with a wide range of information about the European Union 
treaties and a unique collection of data and explains the complex terminologies. The 
research also outlines the significance and roles of the member states, institutions and 
programmers and policies. To achieve security of supply by protecting the 
environment during international competitiveness is the main aim of EU energy 
policy. Its objectives were stated in the White Paper on Energy Policy for the EU. EU 
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energy policy is based on market integration and deregulation according to this paper. 
It also should be in the public interest and contribute to consumer protection. 
(Welfens,B. Meyer,W. Pfaffenberger,P. Jasinski,A. Jungmittag) 
Sascha explained the energy security landscape with a clarity. The relationship 
between security and ecological destruction also examined. Europe has energy 
dependence and is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Russia is the main 
energy exporter of the EU.  Ukraine, is being important transit country for Europe, 
itself depends on gas imports from Russia. Ukraine and the EU is discussing new 
cooperation and partnership agreement that will provide Ukraine to integrate into EU 
domestic energy market. Francesco, Solorio suggest that it is crucial to understand the 
role of energy for appreciate European integration. Energy is not deeply rooted in 
construction of the union but, has been driver of integration. Authors explores the 
new European energy policy, by highlighting the significance of instruments, market 
dimensions and environment policy. The importance of energy security and climate 
change has made the creation of European energy policy. Energy policy goals are laid 
down in the Lisbon Treaty.  
After signing a cease-fire agreement with Armenia by the mediation of Russian 
Defence Minister Pavel Grachev in May 1994. Then Heydar Aliyev turned to deal 
with the preparation of the oil contracts with the Western oil companies. All foreign 
companies that participate in Azeri oil project signed a “Contract of Century”. 
Gorkmaz argue that, it became difficult for Russia and Iran to maintain a legal 
argument against their recognition of Azeri sector in the Caspian Sea, after their 
public-private companies signed a treaty. Then Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an 
agreement on Baku-Supsa pipeline. This pipeline was accomplished in 1999. These 
options were horrifying for Russia and Iran. 
Francis claims that, there have been  several attempts to formulate a common energy 
policy. The cause of its failure was the member states’ reluctance to pool sovereignty 
in this politically sensitive area. Both- the orientation of official energy policies and 
the balance of other policies that affect to energy sector has shifted over the decades. 
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His research focuses on the development energy policy of the European Union and its 
importance for domestic energy policies.  
 Olga and Keith analyzed the economic and domestic sources of Russian foreign and 
security policies. Population change and ethnic conflicts are potential reason of 
domestic instability. People are not so opposite to the new government and vast 
majority of Russians see government as a substantial improvement over 1990s. 
Russian economy grew in 2007 and it made possible for the country to spend more on 
defense. The current foreign policy of Russia focused on to increase Russia’s 
prestige. For achieve this goal, government support economic growth, and 
demonstrate power to keep Russia secure.  
Michael argues about the difficulties to define even to detect new foreign policy of 
Russia because it differs from Soviet foreign policy. Russia’s political and military 
involvement in the Soviet successor states and diplomacy in the Gulf region suggest 
that Russia will not allow itself to slip on the world stage. Russia remains an 
important player in the Caspian region too. Because of the Nagorno- Karabakh 
conflict, Azerbaijan and Armenia has become dependent on Russia for their security. 
Russian troops withdrew from Azerbaijan but remained in Gyumri and Yerevan. 
Russia works within Minsk group of OSCE, which for to settle the Nagorno-
Karabakh dispute, in contrast to its earlier conduct.  
Azerbaijan has no direct border with the European Union. Following the EU 
enlargement policy, Azerbaijan joined to EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), when it 
was launched in 2006.  Jacqueline claims that ENP encouraged states to take on EU 
norms and rules for creating stability and democracy. The transmission of European 
standards and expansion of energy cooperation set human rights as the EU priorities. 
The EU is main economic player and trading partner of Azerbaijan.  
Carlo and Alessandro suggest the different approaches and their consequences of the 
development of the Energy Community with its impact on regional integration and 
energy policy. The research enriched with different case studies on the role of 
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independent agencies. It also provide a better understanding of institutional and 
economic eco-system that characterize the Mediterranean area. The region of 
Mediterranean full of different cultures, religion and ideas and energy is playing a 
strategic role for all the countries in the area. It is the reason why the EU has interest 
in the region. South-East Europe and eastern neighbours are relevant for the EU 
because of transit perspective and access to energy resources. 
TANAP project will enable to export Azerbaijani gas to European customers for the 
first time through Turkey’s border. Indeed, Azerbaijan will gain access to multiple 
pipelines and buyers.  André, Timur and Mehmet claim that as the result, this project 
will give an opportunity to Azerbaijan a significance presence in the European gas 
market. It will also increase Turkey’s role as a transit hub to Europe. TANAP project 
also guarantees a fight for Turkey to re-export gas to third countries. The pipeline 
will cost approximately 7 billion dollar and will transport 16 billion cubic meters of 
gas each year. Michael, Rovshen and Fevzi shows how the operation and construction 
of TANAP will accelerate the economic integration of Caspian states. It allows 
Azerbaijan with Georgia to gain additional autonomy from Russia. The project also 
will help Turkey to meet its domestic demand for natural gas. It also considers a very 
small step toward the realization of EU energy goals by increasing European political 
power and wreaking Russian influence in the Caucasus.   
Vitaly claims that Russia naturally has vital interests in the Caspian region. Oil and 
gas component makes this area meaningful. The Caspian region has become a new 
geopolitical concept denoting Eurasian rivalries over geopolitics and energy in the 
region. The energy deposits of the region are not large enough so, it will not shake the 
world but will shape the future of the region. The future of Caspian energy is 
unknown. However, it is certain that cooperation is needed for transport and sell these 
resources. Robert and Rjan research about different issues of Energy and Conflict in 
the Caucasus and Central Asia is clear and informative. It offers new essential 
findings regarding to impact of energy on the political and economic life of 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.  
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The failure of the former forces of the Soviet Union in the Caucasus changed the 
balance of forces in favor of the Turkey. Turkish air forces and Field Army based at 
Erzurum, across the Turkish border. For Russian nationalists Turkey is also 
characterizes as the leading power of the Turkic people looking for domination over 
the Central Asian States. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan willing to join to the 
technical assistance and military training with Turkey. Azerbaijan with Turkey signed 
a declaration- "Deepened Strategic Cooperation" in 1997, May.  Therefore, Moscow 
wants to normalization relations with the Ankara in the regions, in terms of its 
security issues. 
Zbigniew and Paige assembled a documentary portrait of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) drawing on official publications, reposts and broadcast. 
This study supply historical background and identification of key issues about the 
relations of Russia and CIS. Turkmenistan position is to resist Russian integrationist 
pressures and attract Western investments as much as possible.  
Central Asian republics and their economic ties with neighbouring states will do 
much to weaken the status as great power of Russia. In this case, Russia is facing the 
threat of loss of its monopoly and the richest natural resources such as energy, gold 
and rare metals. Russia also clearly disapproves the transportation of oil from 
Azerbaijan to other states. As the result, Russia will lose an important source of 
imports and its influence over Azerbaijan and other Central Asian states. 
 Carlo and Azad presented a research work addressed to arms race, demand 
cooperation and energy security of the Caspian region. After dissolution of the Soviet 
Union Caspian oil and gas extraction again turned to be the key geostrategic and 
geoeconomic benefit. It turned Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to be active players in 
the geoeconomics and geopolitics in the region. Currently, the Caspian are hosts 
multi pipelines that carry million tons of crude and billion cubic meters of natural 
gas.  
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The end of Cold War created new opportunities for states. It encouraged Turkey to 
take active steps in Post-Cold War era. Idris and Brown analyzes Turkey’s relations 
with USA, EU, Caucasus, Russia, Middle East, and China. Turkey with the USA 
make efforts to keep Russia and Iran out of the region.  Ankara also support the 
integration of the Caucasus and Central Asia into Western institutions. Azerbaijan 
and Georgia has close relations with Turkey, while it has no diplomatic relations with 
Armenia. For Turkey, Armenian policy considered against its national interests, 
security and territorial integrity since invasion of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory. 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline was the most important political and economic 
achievement of two countries. There were also agreement to transport Azerbaijani 
and Turkmen gas to Turkey.  Richard claims Azerbaijan and Turkey have growing 
levels of trade and mutual investment. Azerbaijani enter to Turkey without a visa. 
Turkey supplied Azerbaijan with military assistance for a long time. Recent times, 
companies of both states also began co-producing military equipment. Turkey has 
also a military program in Azerbaijan. The conclusion of his study is to improve 
Turkish role in the political relations with Caucasus and Iran as well as with Syria.  
Galym studied the relations among Turkey and Central Asian republics. The political 
governments in Central Asia are mistrust to the Turkish governance characterized by 
tense political struggle of political parties that represents opposing views. Galym 
claims that friendly relations between them can be seen as “win-win” position for two 
parties. Central Asian states can find more chances to integrate outside world by 
building democratic societies. Turkey at the same time will increase the number of its 
partners and find new markets for its goods. The best way of building close relations 
between Turkey and Central Asia lies through the adoption of passive secularism 
inclusive national identity building. Turkey and Central Asian states need to form 
“general identities” with the aim to build multicultural and tolerant societies. Turkic 
has to be perceived as being tolerant and open to other nations and societies.  This 
research gives information for reader about Turkish sustainable political and cultural 
relations with Central Asia, the adoption of secular model by Central Asia. 
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 Anita argue that the Turkish Model was a myth as “democratic, liberal society” as a 
model for the post Soviet Turkic world. The idea about Turkish model of a “secular 
democratic” arouse outside the implications that Muslim country with this model 
aiming to achieve Western standards by applying liberal free-market policies. 
Turkey’s geostrategic location is also important fact in the “cultural-historical 
connection. Within these connections, the linguistic connection had always remained 
important. Turkish language Society has engaged creating a unified Turkish 
language. The term of “Turkish Model” gained popularity in the early 1990s, and it 
was identified as the most suitable model for development ethically Turkic-and 
Muslim dominant former Soviet Union republics. It helps us to understand the reality 
of the Model from Turkish perspectives and examine whether the Turkic model 
makes sense both from historical and contemporary perspective. 
Alidad and Aria studied the foreign relations of Iran in domestic perspectives in the 
twentieth century. The authors provide the readers with the identities and 
backgrounds of pre and post-revolutionary leaders in Iran and discuss how to 
integrate Iran into constant relationships that benefit Iran, region and the world. The 
understanding about Iran by the world and about the world by Iran is current 
predicament. A glance at the world’s map shows that Iran is situated in the center of 
Central Eurasia.  It is an area, in which world’s main powers- the USA, EU and Asia 
have vital interests. The main power blocks often compete since it contains a major 
portion of the world’s oil and gas reserves. Iran is the cultural and geopolitical center 
of the region connecting to The Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. That is why, Iran’s 
stability has a great influence to the harmony or chaos of the region. 
 Frederik argue that The Caucasus is one of the most complicated regions in the 
world. There are several different religions, people, political units and conflicts in the 
region. A transit routes for oil and gas adds an extra significant and historic rivalry 
and tensions. For that reason, the region’s conflicts will continue and attract outside 
attention.  For filling the gap the author introduced the Caucasus covering with its 
geography, history, economics, politics, population, religion, culture, conflicts and 
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international relations. His study combined and linked the fundamental knowledge of 
the region with clear structure and it is a good guide for readers. 
 Hooman analyze the security of the newly independent states in the Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. After collapse of Soviet Union, fifteen newly independent states each 
hosted different ethnic groups.  All of these states began to transition process from a 
centralized political system to a form of free enterprise having a political system with 
the new economy. However, none of them was ready to this gigantic economic and 
political project alone. Today, the economy of these nations are neither capitalist nor 
socialist and political systems represented by authoritarianism, maintaining some 
aspects of the Soviet totalitarian system such as human rights abuses and repression.  
The reason of their failure to compete the transition was that, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia were unable to provide the basic needs of their population. Border 
disagreements, territorial disputes, political instability and other many potential 
factors make internal and external conflicts, civil wars in the both regions. This 
research is also valuable for its chronologies, black and white photos, tables and 
maps. 
 Rafis studied the historical development of Turkmenistan. In introduction author 
provide us with a chronological history of Turkmenistan in 20s century, its economic 
and political development, nation building and ethnic policies. After independence, 
Turkmenistan still faces various difficulties in structural and economic, security 
issues, growing competition between different clans and poverty. This is the first 
comprehensive reference book that published in English providing the details about 
contemporary history, culture and economy of Turkmenistan.   The bibliography of 
the research helps readers to find resources and materials in special areas.  
 Wesley study deals with the twelve independent republics that became members of 
CIS after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He focuses on recent political and 
economic developments with sections that deal with military, religion, education and 
foreign policy that help to define each republic and their differences.  
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Annie ‘s study is a complete contribution to understand contemporary South 
Caucasus dynamics and  divided into three parts. First part deals with the security 
issues that faced Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia; second part describes these dynamics 
from a regional point of view, including here relations with Iran, and Turkey and the 
third part look at integration processes affecting the region and relations with EU and 
NATO. Because of its clear structure, it makes a good starting point for readers and 
researchers to learn more about the political economies of Central Asian region. 
 In 1990s, the new independent Muslim countries, in Asia and the Caucasus faced 
with conflicts, and instability that stretches from central Europe to the Far East. The 
aims Moshe study are first to draw attention to both scholarly and popular 
publications, second to re-examine the” established truth” with regard to the Caspian 
States. The research draw attention the water problem in Central Asia, the “Southern 
Azerbaijan” issues and  Ajaria and Javakheti, the problems of multi-ethnic Dagestan 
and unity attempts in the Northern Caucasus. Moreover, the questions about the 
democracy of fundamentalist Islam, the relations between nationalism and Islam in 
the region were also analyzed.  
According to Keith, the short-term interests of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan interests 
in the dispute over Azeri and Chirag oilfields in the Caspian Sea is contrary to their 
long-term interests and for their mutual benefits. Increasing militarization presents a 
security dilemma in the Caspian Sea. It seperates Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan from 
their goals. Second the obstruction of Russia play a large role in the negotiations 
between two countries. Kremlin puts its effort into preventing any energy project in 
the region. However, it is better for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to negotiate than to 
block relations. 
Joachim and Herman addressed to Central Asia region from a political-economy 
perspectives. This research share the methodological approach and considers 
institutions as the most important element of economic performance. According to 
him, institutions fulfill two main functions: first, they economize on transaction costs 
and second, they may set incentives to redistribute money, resources or power. The 
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second causes institutional change, which may be generally welfare enhancing. These 
institutional factors observes that economic change in Central Asia show problems 
and challenges as in most other transition countries. These states have problems with 
liberalization, stabilization and privatization and it is clear that Central Asian states 
have certain similar and common characteristics that they do not share with other 
states. 
Andrey and Aleksey study the physical oceanography, marine biology and chemistry, 
pollution of the Caspian Sea. Authors present the main features of the environment 
situation of the sea in the second half of the 20th century. Current problems of the 
Caspian Sea linked with the chemical pollution of the sea and it has impact upon the 
biological resources. This research based on several different observational data 
collected by the authors and it helps researchers about the wide scope of problems 
from regional climate, pollution studies and biology.  
Vedat and Salomon addressed to issues concerned to Turkish European policy and 
Europeans foreign policy towards Turkey as well as security defense policy.  The 
United States has always had invisible hand in Europe and Turkey’s relation.  
Without the diplomatic support of the US, no avenue in to the European Union has 
been specified. The security interests of Turkey in the Mediterranean region and the 
Black Sea also were discussed. Today Turkey’s foreign policy stands at a crossroads. 
Conflicts in the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean 
have brought Turkey to the current challenges.   
Sara discuss the meeting of the officials of Azerbaijani, Turkish and Turkmen in 
Antalya on August 28. The main discussions of Foreign Ministers were projects 
supported by these states in different areas regarding to bilateral relations and other 
mutual issues. Other main issues of discussion were cooperation fields of transport 
and energy, which stands at the center of economic projects. The Antalya Declaration 
was signed after the meeting, this study is important for readers to get information 
about the negotiations process and projects of three states. 
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 David and Robert suggest a guide to international maritime boundaries. The expert 
analysis of all international maritime boundaries and comprehensive coverage of 
every modern maritime boundary treaty concluded from 1942 to 2010. These features 
make this research comprehensive, accessible resource in the ground.  A major 
question arising whether the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention ha influenced state 
practice.  
The main idea of the study is to settle these disputes and to protect the Caspian Sea 
environment. Ascher and Natalia argue that the Caspian Sea region is important from 
the global, environmental and regional security perspectives.  New issues in terms of 
economy and geopolitics have created competition in the region. There is debate over 
how the Caspian Sea and its resources should be divided among coastal states. While 
most Caspian Sea states strive to develop the region’s immense hydrocarbon potential 
it is clear that the ecosystem is at risk.  
Mehdi Parvizi claims the Caspian region will be one of the most important geo 
political region in the 21st century with the increasing energy demand of countries. 
His research focuses on two major aspects of the post-Cold War era-the post-Soviet 
geopolitics of Central Asia and Caucasus, and second the current conflict and 
cooperation between regional powers, Western powers and transnational cooperation 
over energy resources of the Caspian region. By looking these aspects, the author 
shows how the struggle happens among different actors.  
Oystein study the political and economic factors behind the fluctuation in the world 
oil prices and the changing balance of power between the main oil exporters in the 
region by analyzing the world’s dependency on Middle Eastern oil. His study is 
valuable and highly recommended for those who wishes to understand the relations 
among oil suppliers, consumers and governments.  
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Introduction 
In spite of common ethnic, geographic and cultural ties, misunderstanding and years 
of mutual rivalry dominated in Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations. Debated oil fields 
in the Caspian Sea led to critical period between two countries for more than 20 
years. Nevertheless, some positive trends have been observed recently in bilateral 
ties, while a number of problems on the political agenda remain unresolved. The 
thesis reviewed the history of Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations under different 
presidents, studied the root causes of problems in bilateral ties and explored ways to 
address them after the dissolution of Soviet Union. 
      Thesis has three chapters; the first chapter examines diplomatic relations 
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan during the presidency of Heydar Aliyev and 
Saparmurat Niyazov, as well as under the leadership of Ilham Aliyev and Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov. During Niyazov’s presidency, the relations between two 
countries got complicated in the mid90s, due to tensions over legal status of the 
Caspian Sea and gas debt, which shipped from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. In 2001, 
countries closed their diplomatic missions, and cancelled direct flights between two 
states’ capitals.  
   After death of Niyazov in 2006, a new era started in Azerbaijani-Turkmen 
relations. In 2008, the visit of Berdymukhamedov to Baku and the discussion of new 
development prospects by two presidents had been an important landmark in the 
Azerbaijani-Turkmen relations. After this visit, Azerbaijan paid its 44.8 million USD 
debt for gas. Both sides expressed new efforts to cooperate and many expected that 
the relations will become warmer. However, the different views in some issues of the 
countries still increased the uncertainty of mutual beneficial cooperation between two 
states. I tried to discuss the differences in state policies of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan and the reasons that caused disagreements between the leadership of 
two states.  The focus was on disagreement over two oilfields in the Caspian Sea, 
which have stalled for many years the development of cooperation in other fields as 
well. 
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      Environment in the Caspian Sea is not as calm as it looks. Today, “Caspian Five”- 
Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Iran have been unable to reach 
consensus on how it should be divided. In the second chapter, I tried to explain the 
main causes of complicated atmosphere in the region. Lack of clarity of the Caspian 
Sea legal status, clash of coastal states over resources, and the competition among 
major regional powers: Russia, Iran, Turkey and advanced industrialized countries 
such as: United States and Europe over region resources. The role of Russia in the 
region will be a primary focus, especially with the regard to energy security of the 
region. 1 
     Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, three littoral states agreed among 
themselves on demarcation of their sectors in the sea based on the median line 
method (which has the same distance from opposite shores). They signed the 
relevant agreements in 1998 (Kazakhstan and Russia), 2001 (Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan) and 2003 (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia). However, these 
agreements were not accepted by Turkmenistan and Iran, as they did not agree with 
the provisions of the above-mentioned agreements.  
     Iran claims an equal delimitation of the sea. According to the Iran-supported 
proposal, each coastal state would receive 20% of share. Iranian coast is the shortest 
among coastal states and in this case, it seems impossible that other coastal states 
will support this claim.2 
    Position of Turkmenistan on this matter is unclear, as it has changed many times. 
In 1997, Turkmenistan claimed that Azeri and Chirag oilfields, which Ashgabat 
calls Khazar and Osman, located on the territory of Turkmenistan and, therefore, 
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they should belong to Turkmenistan. In 1998 February, Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan issued joint statement, which reflected the agreement of both countries 
on the median line division of the Caspian Sea. However, there was still a 
disagreement on the co-ordinates of division: the countries could not come to a 
common position on where to draw the lines. It was mainly related to the disputed 
oil field, which Azerbaijan named as Kapaz, while Turkmenistan called it Serdar. 3  
   At the same time, the Caspian region is not far from the influence from outside 
powers and it is part of the huge geopolitical competition over the control of oil and 
gas. However, what forces determines the Caspian countries’ success and failures? 
Can geopolitical games destabilize the situation in the region? Will states be able to 
reach resolution on the legal status of the Caspian Sea? 
    The third section will analyse the necessity of continued negotiation process and 
finding the common decision acceptable for two countries, which would be in line 
with international legal norms. Taking into account Azerbaijan’s geographical 
location and existing pipelines that deliver Azerbaijani oil and gas to European 
market, our country can be a bridge for Turkmenistan in delivering its natural gas to 
new markets. In case of continued mistrust between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, 
both states will lose their chance to benefit from joint co-operation that stems from 
the current geopolitical situation. 4 
 
          Chapter1. The history of bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan 
1.1. The state of bilateral relations during the presidency of Heydar Aliyev and 
Saparmurat Niyazov. 
     Azerbaijan is the largest country in the South Caucasus with an area of 86,600 
square km, and is situated between Europe and Asia. The main routs of trade, 
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migration from East to the West and North to the South cross its territory. 
Azerbaijan also has an ancient culture and history. It has borders with Russia to the 
north, Georgia and Armenia to the west, Turkey to the northwest, Iran to the south 
and the Caspian Sea to the east. Azerbaijan's demography and history was shaped 
by its location and geography.  Its main wealth is oil, which is the main source of 
budgetary income, and not only used for the electricity production but also for 
valuable medicine. As oil became the most important problem in the 20 century, oil 
producing countries, as well as Azerbaijan, began to pursue special strategies to 
emerge as player in the world energy politics.5 By the adoption of its new 
Constitution on 12 November 1995, the political system of Azerbaijan was formed 
and completed. According to this document, Azerbaijan is a democratic, secular 
and unitary state. The president plays major role in the political system of 
Azerbaijan and carries the executive power. His main duty is to supervise state 
power apparatus and to define the main directions of the state policy. Legislative 
power is carried out by Milli Majlis (Parliament) and Judicial power carried out by 
the courts. 
     Supreme Council (former name of the Parliament) of Azerbaijan adopted a 
Declaration of Independence on 18 October 1991. In September 1991 and 1992, the 
elections were held, but neither president succeeded in politically control and unify 
the new Republic, so struggling Parliament called Heydar Aliyev in June 1993 to 
Baku. Those times were not so easy because of Nagorno Karabakh war between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Heydar Aliyev was thriving as the governor of 
Nakhichevan at that time, and become the central figure in the political life of the 
country.  He was officially elected as a President of the Azerbaijan Republic on 
October 1993. In 1994, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed on a 
ceasefire. During the rule of Heydar Aliyev the stability was restored and 
Azerbaijan began to develop and flourish under his leadership.  Heydar Aliyev was 
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born on 10 May 1923.  He studied at the Architecture Department of the Azerbaijan 
Industry Institute (Present Azerbaijan State Oil Academy). Then, in 1957, he 
graduated from the Baku State University, with degree in history. Heydar Aliyev 
held the post of deputy chairman in 1964 and from 1967 he became a chairman of 
the Committee of State Security under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. In 1969, he was elected the first Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Heydar Aliyev was elected an alternate 
member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist party 
of the Soviet Union and then appointed the first deputy chairman of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of the USSR. This opportunity gave him to become one of the leaders of 
the USSR, and a member of parliament of the Supreme Council of the USSR and 
for five years deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the USSR.  In 1990, 
Heydar Aliyev was elected as a deputy to the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan. 
During 1991-1993 years he became a chairman of the Supreme Council of the 
Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and was elected the chairman of the New 
Azerbaijan Party in the 1992. Second time he won elections on 11 October 1998.6  
     Turkmenistan is the second largest country in Central Asia, after Kazakhstan. It 
has borders with Iran to the south and southwest, Afghanistan to the south and 
southeast, Kazakhstan to the northwest, and the Caspian Sea to the west and 
Uzbekistan to the east and northeast. It also shares many historical relations with 
the Caucasus. Persian, Turkic and Russian influences have shaped human 
geography and landscape of the country. It also weakened the building of Turkmen 
identity. The large part of Turkmenistan is desert or steppe, the sands of Kara Kum 
Desert covers 80 percent of the total land. Most of the people live in oasis 
settlements. The main three rivers of Turkmenistan are: the Murgap, the Tedzhen, 
and the Amu Derya. The capital is Ashkhabat, the trade routes from north to the 
south and from south to the east cross this city. The official language of 
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Turkmenistan is Turkmen, which is part of the Ural-Altaic language group and 
includes the family of Turkic languages. The majority of the population is Sunni 
Muslim. Islamic religion was an integral part of Turkmen identity. Turkmenistan 
experienced 110 years of Soviet domination and was under the cultural, political 
and economic domination which employed by imperial Russia. It was one of the 
largest states, which emerged as an independent one, rejecting communist ideals in 
1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Turkmen Supreme Soviet declared the 
independence of Turkmenistan with the affirmation of national referendum on 26 
October. The Constitution was adopted on 18 May 1992.7 
During post-independence Turkmenistan has been dominantly ruled by Saparmurat 
Niyazov, who was also called Turkmenbashi. He was born on 19 February 1940. 
Niyazov’s father was killed during the WWII. His mother and brothers died as a 
result of earthquake in Ashgabat in 1948. First, he was raised as an orphan, and 
later with his distant relatives. He graduated from the Leningrad Polytechnic 
Institute with the degree in power engineering. Then Saparmurat Niyazov had 
joined the Communist Party in 1962, and become the head of the Ashgabat 
administration in 1980, and in 1985, he was the First Secretary of the Communist 
Party of Turkmenistan. 
    Turkmenistan maintained close ties with the former Soviet Republics, especially 
in an economic field in early 1990s, and joined the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) in 1991, December.  Turkmenistan also joined a summit of Turkic 
nations in Istanbul. The main goal was to extend economic and cultural relations 
with Turkey. It helped the development in trade, investment, and tourism opened 
door for cooperation on educational and cultural issues, between two states.   
 After independence, Turkmenistan government actually focused on building 
its independent foreign policy, and focused on three major priorities: First, to 
resolve all disputes peacefully and to build sustainable bilateral relations with the 
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former Soviet republics and with neighbours such as -Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Second, to establish political and 
economic relations with Western countries and with the USA. Third, to maintain 
security for its energy resources and its routes. However, over time there were some 
changes, in the country's foreign policy. In 1991, after independence, Niyazov 
established strong organs of power and consolidated his control through these 
organs. Then the Communist Party of Turkmenistan was renamed the Democratic 
Party of Turkmenistan and Niyazov became its chairman. According to the 
constitution of May 1992, the head of the state also was considered the head of 
government and as the chairman of the Cabinet of ministers. Saparmurat Niyazov 
also served as the commander -in- chief of Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan's 
parliament voted to extend the term of office of President Niyazov until 2002, at the 
end of 1993, for allowing the president to complete his ten-year development 
program. It was ratified in a referendum on 15 January 1994. The Turkmen 
People's Council voted to make Niyazov president for life in 1999. After 
independence Niyazov has paid a great attention to nation -building. His regime 
exchanged Soviet hammer and sickle for traditional, national symbols- such as a 
flag, an anthem and celebration of new national holidays like Independence Day, 
Flag Day, Carpet Day and Melon Day, it also expressed new patriotism through 
population. He has adopted the title Turkmenbashy -" The Father of the Turkmen" 
During his term Turkmenistan developed and he brought the Turkmen people to 
Golden Age.8 
  When the former Soviet republics become an independent in the 1990s, many 
expected that they would form trade, economic and political unions, or alliances 
with one another that allows for the free and easier movement but these states 
struggled among themselves and have expressed little desire to work together.  
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Turkmenistan is closer to Azerbaijan for its culture and religion among the Central 
Asian states. Both countries' religion are Islam and both nations are considered 
Oghuz Turks. These factors have always been important for the formation of 
bilateral relations of both countries. The Azerbaijani’s oil specialists have been 
worked In Turkmenistan during Soviet Union and have been played the main role 
in the oil industry of Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan’s diplomatic 
relations go to back to 1990s. In 1991, The Alma- Ata Declaration was signed 
among 11 head of states, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan signed this document. 
Declaration seeking to develop the relations on the basis of mutual recognition and 
respect for state sovereignty and the rejection of the use of force, the threat of use, a 
peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, freedoms and fulfilment 
of commitments. 9 The Embassy of Turkmenistan opened in Baku on 8 June 1999. 
This event was considered the officially establishment of diplomatic relations 
between two states. The Embassy of Turkmenistan temporary was closed in 
Azerbaijan, 2001, 4 June and the excuse for this action was “financial problems” 
but was reopened in 2008. 10 However, commentators linked this measure with the 
ongoing disputes over the ownership of petroleum deposits in the sea. Azerbaijan 
Embassy opened in Ashkhabad in 2002, August.  
The period of presidency of Saparmurat Niyazov the relations between two states 
were complicated. In particular, the tensions between two states was due to the 
position, which demonstrated by Turkmenistan on Caspian legal status of national 
borders and sectors. In addition, the position of Turkmenistan harmed the bilateral 
relations in matters of cooperation in the Caspian Sea, developing and bringing its 
hydrocarbon reserves to foreign markets.11 
   The meeting of the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev and the 
president of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov was held during the Summit of 
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Heads of CIS member countries, held on 23-24 December 1993 in Ashgabat. The 
parties exchanged their views on the development of bilateral relations between the 
two countries as well as in regional context, and their interests and international 
issues. 
   On May 14, 1994- Heydar Aliyev -the President of the Azerbaijan Republic, have 
done a working visit to Turkmenistan in the frame of Economic Cooperation 
Organization Summit Meeting. President Heydar Aliyev attended in the celebration 
of the Independence Day of Turkmenistan on 26-27 October. The president of 
Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov visited to Azerbaijan, On March 18-19, 1996. 
During this visit, several documents were signed between two states. They are: 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan, Baku Declaration, the Agreement on Cooperation in the field of 
education, the Protocol on Consultations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, 
Consular Convention, the Agreement on Cooperation in the field of trade shipping 
and other documents.  
     Azerbaijan celebrated the extraction of the first oil from Chirag field in 1997, 
November. Turkmenistan also was invited advanced to ceremony on this occasion, 
but president Niyazov boycotted the ceremony and sent a message to Azerbaijan 
that Azerbaijan’s intention to exploit production in disputed areas creates 
undesirable and serious complications to international investors’ activities.12 
   Heydar Aliyev and Saparmurat Niyazov, at the meeting, which held on 13 
December 1997 at the Summit of Heads of States of OIC in Tehran, agreed to 
establish export group countries to identify the midline of the Caspian Sea and the 
solution of issues of supplies of some deposits in the Caspian Sea. During The 
Summit of Caspian States Meeting, on April 2002, Heydar Aliyev have done a 
                                                          
12 Michael P Croissant, Bulent Aras, Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, (USA, 1994 )16, 214- 215 
 
26 
 
working visit to Turkmenistan. In summit, no document was produced and Caspian 
coastal states left issue open. 
  Saparmurat Niyazov has earned a lot of respect, trust and high estimate of his 
political activities, a great contribution to the development of science, education and 
culture of Turkmenistan, and more importantly, for the strengthening and 
development of Turkmenistan's independence. Therefore, Baku State University 
awarded Niyazov the highest award- the title of Honorary Doctor of the 
University.13 
   
1.2. Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations during the leadership of Ilham Aliyev 
and Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. 
     The relations become warmer during the presidency of Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov and Ilham Aliyev. It was perceived that the new Turkmen 
President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov would be more flexible on the 
negotiations and relations between two states. 
    Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov was born June 29 in 1957 in the south -central 
part of the Turkmenistan. He studied at the State medical Institute, where he 
specialized as an oral Surgery and dentistry. Then he studied in Moscow in the 
1980s, received a doctorate in medicine. After the collapse of Soviet Union, he 
worked as a teacher at the Medical Institute in Ashgabat. During the early years of 
the independence of Turkmenistan, he rapidly moved up through the ranks of the 
government. He was appointed as a Minister of Health of Turkmenistan, and 
become the Deputy Prime Minister in 2001. He also served as a personal dentist of 
Saparmurat Niyazov and this have aided in his political advancement. After the 
death of Niyazov in 2006, Berdymukhamedov was elected as a president.14 
Turkmenistan remained as the repressive country during these times. 
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Berdymukhamedov has taken some steps to reverse the most ruinous social policies 
of Niyazov's rule. After his election, Berdymukhamedov announced several 
democratic reforms, such as restoring the tenth year of secondary education and 
five-year course of University degree education, separation of powers-dissolved the 
People's Council and divided its powers between the president and new parliament, 
which had 125 members. He also guaranteed internet access to all, even for children 
who go to kindergarten, also reinstating pensions and social allowances. During the 
presidency of Berdymukhamedov the government has softened some restriction on 
freedoms. During Niyazov's era, there were several political prisons but after 
election of Berdymukhamedov, 9,000 prisoners have been affected by two 
presidential pardons. People were positive about the reforms during 
Berdymukhamedov's term. He announced to establish a multiparty system in the 
country. The Agrarian Party (Daikhan), a second party was founded, in the favour 
of the agrarian reforms which are initiated by the president. However, the functions 
of the party because of the support of the central authorities has no margin of 
manoeuvre. The human rights issues in the country has not been developed since 
Niyazov's death. Repression continues, in spite of a few positive steps. 
Berdymukhamedov has also kept tradition such as granting amnesty to hundreds of 
prisoners during the religious holiday, end of Ramadan and national festivals. The 
election of Berdymukhamedov as a president also revived the slow process of 
modernization of the army. He recognized to develop the living conditions of 
military personnel and military equipment in 2007. He opened a new police 
academy to develop the training of new recruit and to provide them with better 
living conditions. In 2009, Berdymukhamedov passed new bill about the status and 
social protection of military personnel and their families. This bill guaranteed them 
free medical care and decent lodging. 15 
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     The portraits of Niyazov were gradually removed from public spaces during 
2008 and 2009 and popular holidays as International Women's Day and Victory day 
were reinstated. The newspapers, which titles referred to Turkmenbashi or the 
family members of Niyazov, were renamed. In the oath and national anthem, the 
political authorities were eliminated mention of "Turkmenbashi" and it was replaced 
with simply “the President”. On February 19, 2009, the birthday of Niyazov was 
ignored and it accelerated De-Niyazovization. Before, this day was popular holiday 
in Turkmenistan, but now 14 February- the day of inauguration of President 
Berdymukhamedov. 
    After the death of Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev, his son was elected as a 
president of the Azerbaijan Republic. He continued to use the same policy, under 
conditions of political, economic and regional stability. Especially the economy 
began to grow because of growth of the oil and gas sector. For the concentration of 
extra revenues from export of natural resources, The State Oil Fund was established. 
The national committee Forward to Europe was established in the 2006. Azerbaijan 
with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine joined the European Union Program Eastern 
Partnership, for the export oil to Europe.16 The period of presidency Ilham Aliyev 
have been seen as the emergence of a stable foundation of economic growth, 
development. 
 Ilham Aliyev was elected one of five deputy chairmen of the ruling party in 1999 
and was promoted of the first deputy chairman in 2001. He was born in 1961, 24 
December. Ilham Aliyev graduated the faculty of International Relations of the 
Moscow State University and continued his education as a postgraduate in 1982. He 
also received a PhD degree in history. In 1994, Ilham Aliyev was appointed vice-
president of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan and during the conclusion of 
Contract of the Century, he was one of the initiator of negotiations between 
Azerbaijan and Western oil companies. Then he was elected to the National 
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Assembly and later become a president of the national Olympic Committee. He also 
headed Azerbaijan’s delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. Two years later Ilham Aliyev was elected one of PEACE's deputy 
chairmen. In 2003, he was appointed Prime Minister and in October, he earned 
76.84% of the votes and became a President of the Azerbaijan Republic. Then he 
was re -elected in 2008, because of gaining deep respect of Azerbaijani people. 
Ilham Aliyev, in general, wanted to build on his father's accomplishment of making 
Azerbaijan the only, truly independent and powerful state in the South Caucasus, 
trying to preserve and maintain its stability and independence in the formulation of 
state’s  foreign policy, to keep balance between the regional powers and global 
powers. Azerbaijan increased its geopolitical importance and energy resources. 
Modern Azerbaijan is recognized as a country with a great geopolitical importance, 
economic achievements and determining the geopolitical trends in Eurasia and  it 
was possible due to the policy, pursued by the Ilham Aliyev.17 
    Niyazav’ death and Russia’s failure to pay a fair price for Turkmen gas changed 
the geopolitical status-quo. The relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 
entered to a new sphere and began gradually to develop and become warmer.  Ilham 
Aliyev invited the new president of Turkmenistan back to the negotiating table. 18 
Berdymukhamedov responded positively to this invitation and met with Ilham 
Aliyev in 2008. The Heads of State have stressed to intensify and develop of the 
relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in the meeting. Besides this, it was 
also expressed confidence that the official visit of the head of Turkmenistan will 
strengthen the bilateral relations between two countries. After negotiations, the 
agreements were signed between the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs and 
transport of the two countries. In connection with an official visit of Turkmenistan 
President to Azerbaijan, the heads of two states made statements.  In his statement, 
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Ilham Aliyev stressed to problem of the Caspian Sea, and the satisfaction about the 
development of future cooperation in the Caspian Sea, and the effective interaction 
of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in this direction. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov 
also stated in his statement that the cooperation between two states is essentially 
important in the energy sector, which has a base value for the economy of both 
countries having the status of energy in the world countries, and both countries pay 
the special attention to this topic. In general, the goal is that to turn it into 
intergovernmental partnership sphere and strategic direction. In 2008, the previous 
round of Azerbaijani-Turkmen tension associated with oil and gas resources of the 
Caspian Sea ended with the signing of agreement by Presidents Ilham Aliyev and 
Berdymukhamedov. According to this document, the territories of the intersection 
portions of two countries should not engage in any activities of exploration and 
production until the determination of the status of the Caspian Sea. Then, the 
embassies of both countries reopened. Turkmenistan recognized the territorial 
integrity of Azerbaijan and sent delegation to reach agreement on the debt disputes 
with Azerbaijan at the same year. 19 
    On November 28, 2008, Azerbaijani President started his official visit to 
Turkmenistan. During meeting with the President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov he expressed satisfaction with the development of relations 
between two countries in different field, as well as confidence in the further 
expansion of ties. It was also noted that the official visit of the President of 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev to Turkmenistan will further strengthen bilateral relations. 
At the extended meeting, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov has emphasized 
the importance of development the relations of his country with the Azerbaijan 
Republic. Turkmen President also noted the great potential of further expansion of 
relations in many areas. President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov appreciated the 
support of the President of Azerbaijan initiative launched by Turkmenistan in 
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international organizations to ensure the safety of transit pipelines. He highlighted 
the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, rich oil and gas deposits, to 
energy policy in the region at the same position. President Ilham Aliyev also 
stressed the great importance of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan not 
only for these countries but also for the whole of Central Asia and the Caspian, 
Caucasus regions. After meeting, the heads of states signed the agreements on 
transportation to the international railway-ferry lines through ports of Baku and 
Turkmenbasi, registration numbers and organization of accounts for the use of 
wagons and containers, an agreement on cooperation in the education sphere,  The 
Agreement between the Governments of Intergovernmental Commission on 
Azerbaijan - Turkmenistan economic cooperation and other documents. President 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov stated that both states have large hydrocarbon 
reserves and two states hold consensus in this matter. That is why both states are in 
favour of a policy of "open door" transportation and diversification of their 
hydrocarbon reserves. Both sides are unanimous on the development, processing 
and marketing of energy resources. Ilham Aliyev also stressed that now there is a 
great potential for expansion of cooperation in the transport sector in the Caspian 
Sea region. The construction of railway Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway will connect the 
railway track through Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe, as well as through the 
Caspian Sea- with Central Asia. The new Silk Road in two years will be at both 
states disposal, and they will use it. During the visit in the city of Turkmenbashi 
trilateral meeting was held by the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, President of 
Turkey Abdullah Gul and President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov. The meeting noted the high level of relations between three 
countries, stressed the importance of a join meeting between them. Turkmen 
President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov was given a dinner in honour of President 
Ilham Aliyev. By the end of the 2000s economic relations between Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan began gradually develop. After 2008, Azerbaijan debt incurred in the 
early 1990s in the sale of gas between the two countries was achieved promotion. 
January 17, 2008 it was held the first meeting of the Azerbaijani-Turkmen 
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intergovernmental commission on economic and humanitarian cooperation in 
Ashgabat. It was decided to expand ties in trade and economic cooperation, 
including in the areas of transport, telecommunication, oil and gas, environmental 
and humanitarian spheres at the meeting. I International Conference and Exhibition 
on "Oil and Gas potential of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan: Energy, Economy, 
Ecology, cooperation strategy was held in Baku, 9 September, 2008. Thirty-one 
countries presented in the conference and exhibition. Turkmenistan was represented 
by an extensive delegation. At the event, the congratulations of both Presidents were 
read. The address of the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev was awarded for the 
growing international interest in the Caspian Basin, in particular Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov stressed that the strategic 
partnership, in particular to the relations in the petroleum sector strengthened the 
transition and neighbourly relations between two countries. Trade ties between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in 2008 were weak (in $million): import-45.9, export-
14.0, the trade surplus-(-31.9). In quarter of 2010, trade relations between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are expressed as follows (in millions of US Dollars): 
Import-3068.9, export-12823.6, the foreign trade balance-9754.7. 
   In Azerbaijan have always been a special interest to the Turkmen literature. 
Salman Mumtaz in his article "The Turkmen poets «in the journal "Maarif ve 
medeniyyet"(Education and Culture) especially mentioned the name of the great 
Turkmen poet Ahmed Yasevi. Members of the Institute of ANAS published in the 
Azerbaijani language book "Selected Works Molla-Nepes". The book was presented 
to President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. Turkmen President praised the book 
as another successful step towards developing the Turkmenistan- Azerbaijan 
relations. In 2009, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov gave the State Reward to the 
Azerbaijani Embassy in Turkmenistan-Vahdat Sultanzadeh Mammadaga oglu, for 
his contribution to the development of relations between two countries. May 21, 
2010 it was hosted a conference on the life and work of a prominent Turkmen poet 
Magtymguly at Baku State University. During his visit to Turkmenistan Ilham 
Aliyev on November 28, 2008, was awarded the title of Honory Professor of the 
33 
 
Turkmen State University, which is named Makhtumkuly. Ilham Aliyev made a 
speech at the ceremony. In 2009, November 3-6 Days of Azerbaijani Culture were 
held in Turkmenistan. In connection with the organization of high-level events, the 
President Gurbanguly Berymuhammedov signed a disposal. During the Days of 
Azerbaijani Culture in Turkmenistan, masters of culture and art of the Nakhchivan 
Autonomous Republic presented Azerbaijan. Turkmenistan Musical Dram Theatre, 
which is named after Magtumguly was, staged the musical comedy of famous 
Azerbaijani composer Uzeyir Hajibeyov "Arshin Mal Alan". In the anniversary of 
the birth of national leader Heydar Aliyev on may10, 2010, it was hosted the 
presentation of the Turkmen language the version of book "Heydar Aliyev" from 
the series " Life of remarkable people" in Ashkhabad, in the capital of 
Turkmenistan. May 11, 2010 the Embassy of Turkmenistan in Azerbaijan published 
the book in Azerbaijani language, which included an article entitled" Economic 
strategy of Turkmenistan: Relying on the people, for the people" the President of 
Turkmenistan. Despite of the very close ties that link Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, 
a number of claims impeded the development of Turkmenistan's relations to the 
level of strategic partnership. However, compared to previous years, the relationship 
develop more in recent times. Now the states keen on to cooperate and develop the 
trade economic relations between two states. Both of these states have large energy 
reserves and play an essential role in ensuring energy security and other countries. 
Upon reaching the two countries relations at a high level can further strengthen their 
role in the international arena. 20 
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  2. The influence of regional processes on Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan bilateral 
relations 
2.1. Legal status of the Caspian Sea - areas of discords 
 
     Caspian region is considered one of the oldest oil-producing regions in the 
world. It is a 700-mile-long body of water in Central Asia, landlocked between 
Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran, and between two 
continent-Europe and Asia.  The width ranges from 435 km and 1,030 km long, the 
surface level is around -26, 5 m below MSL. The northern part of Caspian Sea is 
very shallow and the average depth is less than 5 m. However, the depth of the 
southern part is approximately 1025m. The number of small and large rivers, which 
flow into the Caspian Sea, is approximately 130. The largest of these is The Volga 
River that drains 1,400,000 km2 into the northern part of the sea. 21 The Caspian 
Sea is also the largest lake in the world, because it is not linked with the sea, and is 
attached to the Black Sea and the Baltic through the Volga-Don Canal. During 
history, several names were given several names like "the Sea of 
Mazandaran","Tabarestan", "Abescun", "Ghazvin", "Deylam", "Gorgan", "Sari" and 
"Khazar". "Khazar" is also widely used name of Caspian Sea. Caspian actually is 
used in Latin languages, because of the "Caspis" who was the indigenous people 
and lived in the around the sea, just as "Khazars", thus Azerbaijani people call it as 
"Khazar -deniz". The production of Caspian region has been higher, but 
unfortunately, it suffered during the collapse of Soviet Union. After collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the new era opened in the history of oil production in the Caspian 
region and turned into an important international issue. Despite the several problems 
during Soviet period, The Caucasus region is remains the huge oil potential region.  
This region also have unexploited oil sources and some of them have not been 
developed yet. 22 This region is important in international arena. First, because of its 
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geo -strategic position: the Caspian new independent states holds the central and 
important position in the heartland of the Eurasian continent, and the essential trade 
routes from Europe to Asia pass from there, and it cause the interest of the major 
extra-regional powers such as the USA, Europe, China and Russia. They want to 
formulate their own policies in the region. The second factor can be the 
international interest in this region. It is associated with the large reserves of oil and 
natural gas, which lie here. The Caspian region have large resources of crude oil and 
natural gas. However, there are some obstacles to increase the production of oil and 
gas of the region. Actually, the natural gas supplies of region is larger than oil 
resources.  It is difficult to estimate the exact size of these reserves. However, 
according to possible estimate of recoverable oil reserves are 40-60 billion barrels 
and natural gas are between 10 and 20 trillion cubic meters. 23 The average of 2,6 
million barrels per day of crude oil and around 3,4 percent of World supply are 
produced by the Caspian Basins area in 2012.Oil field in the Kazakhstan's onshore - 
Tengiz field has been the biggest contributor the production of region. The majority 
of oil resources in the Caspian basins contain in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but the 
biggest natural gas fields are on the onshore of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. 
Turkmenistan is considered the major gas producer and the majority natural gas 
production comes from the southeast fields of Turkmenistan. 24 The Caspian oil 
reserves are to the equivalent to the gas reserves of either the North Sea or the 
United States. This region is divided into three basins-The South Caspian basin, 
which contain gas, reserves while the North Caspian-basin appears more likely 
contain oil and the Middle Caspian basin, which is thought not to be as prospective 
as the North and South Caspian Basins. Large gas resources were discovered in the 
South Caspian Basin in Azerbaijan, and large oil discovered on the Russian Caspian 
Sea coast and one of the largest oil discoveries in 20 years, offshore Kazakhstan, in 
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the North Basin. The reserves of Caspian Sea gives an opportunity to the region 
states become a large exporters of oil and gas, and this region has several markets. 
Recent times, nearly all Caspian crude oil goes west, via pipeline to and through 
Russia to European markets, and other part goes through the Bosporus straits to the 
Western European markets via the Mediterranean Sea by tankers. Natural gas also 
mainly goes to West through Russia and Russia collects transit fees on Caspian 
energy shipped through its territory and sells own gas oil and gas output to 
European countries in a harder currency. 
    In the beginning 19th century, one of the main interest of tsarist Russia was to 
expand to southward. It caused a series of wars between Russia and Persian 
Kingdom (Iran). Iran was defeated and as result of this, two treaties were signed. 
The first of them was Gulustan Treaty of 1813 prevented Iran to develop its naval 
forces in the Caspian Sea. Second was Turkmenchai Treaty, which signed in 1828, 
it again put limitations on Persian naval shipping. Iran could have only merchant 
navy in the sea.  
     Caspian legal regime remained until the Russian Revolution of 1921. The Treaty 
of Friendship in 1921 abolished all previous treaties and restored Iranian rights for 
shipping in the Caspian. Two states, under the Treaty of Establishment, Commerce 
and Navigation in 1935, August 25, both sides determined the land border without 
delimiting the Caspian Sea boundary. Iran and Russia’s vessels could flying with 
their own flag and they had right in their coastal waters up to 10 nautical miles. In 
1940, March 25, with the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation they affirmed the 10-
mile fishing zone. Soviet and Iran only could do fishing beyond the 10 mile zone 
and Caspian Sea was affirmed as “Soviet-Iranian Sea”. In 1954, a sea boundary 
treaty without delimiting the sea boundary, determined land border between two 
countries across the Caspian Sea. 25 
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    Soviets doctrine and Iran’s municipal law viewed the legal regime of the Caspian 
Sea as a closed sea it is controversial and limited the military and commercial 
activities of littoral states. Soviet-Iranian Treaty in 1940 did not apply to the 
delimitation of subsoil resources and continental shelf of the Caspian Sea.  The 
legislation neither stated nor applied the shared ownership principle in the treaty of 
1940. Both Soviet Russia and Iran supported “common sea” principle. 
    Treaty regarding the fishing rights in the Caspian Sea was signed in 1972 
between Iran and USSR and both sides agreed to establish a joint fishing company. 
Another important treaty was the cultural, technical and scientific agreement 
between Iran and USSR, according to this agreement, both sides signed 
memorandum that the two agreed to study and review of the ecosystem of the 
Caspian Sea. It was agreed to establish a permanent working group on related to the 
pollution of the Caspian Sea. After the collapse of Soviet Union, the legal status of 
the Caspian Sea has become an important international issue with the emerging of 
five independent states: The Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and 
The Russian Federation. Now the five sides were interested to define clear the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea.  However, large scale of oil and gas resources make it 
impossible. After collapse of Soviet Union Russia and Iran lost their territories of 
being neighbours, and after the Caspian Sea have been divided into national 
territories. The countries, which have borders with, Caspian Sea started to take 
separate positions toward the legal regime in the Caspian Sea. It emerged the new 
geopolitical situation during the 1990s. It was due to: Russia withdraw its troops 
from the Caucasus and central Asia, second, the new external actors- both state and 
non -state actors increased their involvement in political and economic issues, the 
third competition increased between Russia and USA. Russian role reduced and it 
gave the opportunity to the regional states to increase international cooperation, as 
they wanted to strengthen their independence. This attempt of course was supported 
by the foreign actors, which were interested in to weaken the Russian power. The 
international actors can be divided into the states and organizations of states in the 
Caspian region. The sates conduct the regional policy according to their interests in 
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the energy resources.  Two major factors that have influence on the Caspian Sea 
region on world energy supply. First factor is the amount of oil and gas resources, 
second is the level of committed investment in the region. 26 
     After 1991, Russia has changed its position on the legal regime of the Caspian 
Sea. Russia claimed as the successor of the USSR declared that it was fully 
committed to the 1921 and 1940 treaties, and held other countries responsible to 
observe these treaties at last to the emergence of new regime. Russia also argued 
that, the treaty, which had signed in the 1921, had laid the mutual condominium for 
shipping in the Caspian Sea and the same rule should be applied to exploitation of 
the resources of Caspian Sea. Russian government also declared that use of the 
Caspian Sea emergence of new emergence of coastal states did not violate the 
existing regime and the Russian Federation sent a letter to the Office of the United 
Nations. This letter, which declared that it considered the newly independent states 
committed to the 1921 and 1940, was about the law of sea and requested that the 
letter be registered as an official U.N document. Russian side even warned the new 
states that they should not enter into separate arrangements. Iran also wanted to 
convince that others it was condominium between Iran and Soviet Union and as the 
Soviet Union was divided into several new countries, Iran should have its original 
share of 50%.  This argument, of course needed more persuasion however, Iran did 
not had it. In addition, Iranian side did some suggestions like to fix or to extend the 
10-mile exclusive fishing zones or make them more general than fishing zones. 
Some scholars in Iran even wanted the government to ask establishment of a 40 or 
50-mile exclusive coastal zone.  The meeting of Caspian's littoral states was held in 
Tehran, in 1992, and the Organization for Cooperation among the Caspian Littoral 
States was created, since this issue, the countries' foreign ministers meet once a 
year. According to this cooperation and meetings, three subject were approved in 
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1996, which were important for countries. 27 First was that the organization was 
established because of to supervise the activities in the Caspian Sea, the second was 
that all countries agreed about the legal regime of the countries should be based on 
common use. Finally, Iran, Russia and Turkmenistan established Oil Company for 
activities in the Caspian Sea.  Now, the position of Russia is that, the Caspian Sea 
seabed should be divided into national sectors. The five coastal states should agree 
on the status of waters, because it is relates to the managing the fishery, the 
protection of the marine environment, and navigation. 28 
       Iran is not seems very enthusiastic about national division of Caspian Sea. After 
1997, Iran in the political-security approach figured that it did not need to share the 
same area with others, before Iran's approach was based on the condominium 
system. The fact was that buffer zone would serve to keep Russia from the lower 
areas of the sea. Iranian Parliament approved a bill, which authorized the National 
Iranian Company to explore, and develop oil, gas resources in the Caspian Sea. It 
strengthened the position of oil establishment of Iran, and its deal with foreign 
companies the exploitation of resources in the field of Iranian part in the Caspian 
Sea. Iran had already signed contracts with European Companies for exploration to 
oil, prior to this bill.  In the speech of Khatami in the summer of 2000, the common 
use shifted totally for dividing the sea, which was started from 9March, 2001. The 
Oil Ministry-Zanganeh mentioned that Iran had waited the determination of the 
legal status of Caspian Sea and never did any explorations, but now Iran would 
proceed with activities in this field, despite the adoption of Caspian legal regime. 
Because Iran should not wait the determination of the Caspian legal regime from the 
other countries. 29 
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    The Republic of Azerbaijan showed its position on that, it will not feel itself 
bound by the treaties which were signed in 1921 and 1940 years by the Iran and 
USSR, and claimed that it should have own territories across the Caspian Sea, as 
they entered into contracts with big oil companies. According to the Azeri 
authorities, the principle of "Clean Slate"- which gives a free hand in choosing their 
destiny to the newly independent countries, the treaties in 1921 and 1940, are not 
valid now, and Caspian Sea must be divided among the states, according to 
international law. They also argued that shipping issues have been limited because 
of the treaties, which signed in 1921 and 1940. They had nothing to do with the 
seabed resources. Azerbaijan have claimed that Iran as the only other party of 
the1921 and 1940 treaties has never objected to the existing practice on the basis of 
the contradiction, however  Azerbaijan has been exploited oil resources of Caspian 
Sea since long time ago. The date even go to back to 1871, which considered the 
oldest oil fields in the world. The wooden pipeline, which considered one of the 
oldest oil pipeline in the world, connected Baku to the Black Sea, the capital of 
Azerbaijan. Swedish Albert Nobel-The founder of Nobel Prizes, who became a rich 
because of these oil operations, designed this pipeline. 30 
    Heydar Aliyev visited the USA in August 1997, for to sign a 10 billion dollar 
agreement with the Western oil companies, to exploit Caspian oil resources. In 
November of this year, Iran informed UN's Secretary -General and protest it. Iran 
and Turkmenistan also protested when the President of Azerbaijan inaugurated the 
Shah Cheragh oil installations on November 12, 1997. The position of Azerbaijan 
toward the legal status of Caspian regime actually has been driven by the belief that, 
the northern part of Caspian Sea, which is rich with oil and gas resources, are to be 
found in Azeri sector. Azerbaijan joined the Russian Camp in 2001, Putin, the 
President of Russia, visited Azerbaijan. During this visit, President Heydar Aliyev 
and Putin agreed to sign a joint statement, between two states, about the 
delimitation of the seabed of the Caspian Sea. However, Iran reacted angrily to this 
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issue, and reminded Russia that it must be consulted with other Caspian Sea states, 
bordering the Sea. A draft agreement was prepared for signature by heads of both 
states for following summer. It also specified the modified median line’s 
geographical coordinates, and in agreement was emphasized that, it will not prevent 
the conclusion of a general agreement by all coastal states. Aliyev and Putin signed 
the agreement on 23 September 2002. 31  Because of the lack of clear delineation of 
Caspian Sea, countries argue on ownership over certain offshore resources, 
Azerbaijan also claim the Serdar (Turkmenistan), Kyapaz (Azerbaijan) field as does 
Turkmenistan, which discovered in 1959 by Azerbaijani geologists. 
    Iran also proposed the establishment of a regional cooperation organization in the 
Caspian Sea. The Russian Federation and Kazakhstan welcomed, Turkmenistan did 
not respond but Azerbaijan rejected this proposal. The Azerbaijani representative 
stated that, it is impossible to talk about any regional cooperation organization, as 
long as the legal regime of Caspian Sea is not determined in the Almaty Conference 
in 1995, May. Iran actually is satisfied with the option of condominium, but it is 
difficult for Iran to convince others to accept this option. Iran wishes to insist the 
division of Caspian Sea into 5 equal sectors, 20% for each states. In the southern 
part of Caspian Sea,  for exploration activities, Iran began to enter into the 
negotiations  with oil companies, and  began include these parts of Caspian Sea in 
its exploration projects, this also showed its readiness to claim the sovereignty of 
these areas. 32 
     The position of Turkmenistan was a sectoral division. Turkmenistan during 
Niyazov’s presidency adopted different position. The problem was not the 
delimitation along median lines, but the method of defining median lines became a 
major question. Azerbaijan considers that, the median line should be determined 
from the end of the Absheron Peninsula. This division would palace Kyapaz field in 
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Azerbaijani waters. Kyapaz (Serdar) field located between the coasts of 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and was discovered by Azerbaijani geologists in 
1959. It is a rich oil field and according to experts, contains 80 million tons of oil 
and 32 billion cubic meters of gas. However, Turkmenistan’s position is that, 
Absheron Peninsula of Azerbaijan protrudes far into the sea to median line. It would 
lie far to the east according to normal practice from the actual shoreline of each 
states. Therefore, Kyapaz field would lie the medial line dividing two sectors 
between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.  For that reason, Turkmenistan supports a 
model that ignores the Absheron peninsula’s existence. 33  
     A National Service for the Exploitation of the Turkmen Sector of the Caspian 
Sea was created in 1999, August. It gave the powers to Turkmenistan Republic to 
regulate navigation and license fishing in the "national sector of Turkmenistan" and 
Russia has cautioned Turkmenistan that, it is contrary to the prevailing regime of 
the Caspian Sea. In 2002, Putin met with Niyazov in Moscow. The  Presidents of 
both countries agreed to find a solution as soon as possible about the solution 
problems concerned the legal regime of Caspian Sea, and of course, to take 
consideration the opinion of other countries as well. They also mentioned that, the 
determination of new legal status would give opportunities such as the creation of 
exploitation of hydrocarbons and biological resources and protection of Caspian's 
ecological system.  
     The President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov noted that while the forming 
of new international legal status of the Caspian Sea it must be take consideration 
that a 20-mile zone free navigation must be separate out in the middle of the body of 
water. Only after the adoption of new legal status of the Caspian Sea, it can be the 
creation of different type of economic centres and cooperation. Therefore, the states 
should solve problem as soon as possible 34 
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     The position of the Kazakhstan is clear and constructive on the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan actually is ally with Azerbaijan over the status of the 
Caspian Sea, but the differences between them in their respective position. The 
position of Kazakhstan is not strictly in the line with the "open sea" variants. 
Kazakhstan proposed that the Caspian Sea, according with a central line, must be 
divided into economic zones. Kazakhstan stated that, the littoral states should 
delimited the Caspian seabed and subsoil asset, which should enjoy national 
jurisdiction and exclusive rights for exploration and development of the mineral 
resources of the seabed. International regulations and practice concerning mineral 
resources deposited beneath frontier waters should be taken into account. 
Kazakhstan and Russia signed the Agreement on delimitation of the bottom of the 
northern part of the sea. Protocol to this Agreement was signed in 2002, May. 
Azerbaijan together with Kazakhstan and Russia agreed on delimitation of the sea in 
early 2000 and agreement on the delimitation among them was signed in 2003, 
May14. Kazakhstan has also involved private foreign ownership by selling the 
majority of shares of Kazakhstan's state oil company, in the oil sector. 
KazMunaiGas- state holding company was created by the government and it sell its 
assets to foreign companies. 35 
   It seems possible to reach the agreement among the coastal states according to the 
determination of legal status of Caspian Sea, which will satisfy at least, the interests 
of five coastal states. Until the consensus will be found on disputes, it is necessary 
to conclude multilateral intergovernmental agreements, which may adopt urgent 
collective measures about protecting the ecology of the Caspian and its resources. 
There were three agreements, which have been proposed in such issues. They are: 
"Agreement on the Conservation and Use of Biological Resources of the Caspian 
Sea"," Agreement on Protection of the Natural Environment of the Caspian Sea", 
and " Agreement on Cooperation of the Caspian States in Hydrometeorology and 
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Monitoring of the Natural Environment of the Caspian Sea". All of these 
agreements are under the consideration of five coastal States. The creation of the 
independent international agency could be desirable for to settle the different 
problems of the Caspian Sea.  36 
 
2.2. The role of the EU-backed gas pipelines in re-approachment    between 
Baku and Ashgabat  
      The geopolitics of the 21st century has symbolized by the energy and it reflects 
countries to diminish reliance on military and political power. Energy today, 
became an instrument of geopolitical competition. International influence has 
become more diverse but the goals of the states are the same: to protect national 
security, to maintain power and control over resources and territories. 
    The unification of European states actually began with the energy policy, as we 
know the European Union formed by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, 18 April, by the 
formation of The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This was essential 
for the reconstruction of Europe after the war. The European Coal and Steel 
Community based on the French foreign Minister, Schumann Plan. Robert 
Schumann and Jean Monnet- French pro-European politician wanted by 
collectivizing coal and steel, to create common interests and stability in the Europe.  
The foreign policy of EU follows the "Monnet method"-which refers to creating 
common political interests and culture of political cooperation through economic 
integration. European Economic Community was established in 1957, which 
developed the EU, the European Atomic Energy Community was launched. To 
promote nuclear technology in all member states was the main task of this 
Community.  The European Atomic Energy Community agreement is become a part 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. The European integration began with the joint management 
of coal and the joint promotion of nuclear energy, but these have failed during the 
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production an integrated concept for European energy policy. It was a due to the 
interests of major states in the European Union.  37 
     In sociological sense, Europe has been institutionalized, and it reduced some 
problems across the member states. The Institutionalization actually developed in 
Europe during 1980s. However, this also caused the problems in several policy 
areas of European integration, which is also concerns energy policy. One of the 
main aims of EU is to protect environment while international competition. The 
white paper on Energy Policy of the European Union clearly declared the main 
objectives of EU energy policy. European Union energy policy is based on 
deregulation, market integration, and the intervention of government must be 
efficient and effective, it also should be in the public interest, and to contribute 
consumer protection, economic and social cohesion according to this paper. The 
Energy Council actually agrees funding of this policy and additional funds can be 
allocated to projects in cohesion fund countries or to all Member States. The main 
structural objectives that European Union emphasized are: to increase the share of 
natural gas, to achieve highest safety standards in nuclear energy, to develop of 
alternative energy resources, like nuclear fusion and other projects. 38 
In spite of EU is considered as a greatest economic and trading power in the world, 
it lacks its own policy. There have not been a coherent European Union foreign 
policy in the question of economic survival. Europe is dependent on energy imports 
from its southern and eastern neighbours, and neighbours in Eastern Europe, and the 
Near, Middle East.  Ukraine, Turkey and Southern Caucasus states are key states in 
this issue, because they serve as a political bridge and transit countries. That is why 
Europe interested in to bring these countries politically and economically closer to 
the EU.  In order to combine the economic, environmental and security interests of 
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all parties, and to regulate it by international treaty, Europe has been strived to sign 
the European Energy Charter- on energy political principles with all neighbours 
since the 1990s. Not only a reliable and affordable, but also an environmental, 
friendly energy supply have been included in the declared objectives of European 
Union. Because it can reduce the dependence on imports of fossil fuels.  One of the 
main of European Union policy is to protect and secure the stability and good 
neighbourly relations on the European continent. 39 
Because of the forecast by the European Commission, the dependence of European 
Union on energy will be continue in the next few decades. First, it is true, because 
of imports of natural gas consumption of the EU members will increase two-and-a- 
half fold between 2000 and 2020.  Oil and gas resources in the North Sea are 
running out. Russia continues being one of the most important exporter of fossil 
fuels and uranium to the European Union. By 2020, oil imports will increase by 20 
per cent and gas imports by 150 per cent from Russia, according to the forecast of 
European Commission.  Iran also has the potential to become the important gas 
supplier of European Union, thus Turkey will become the most important transit 
country in this case. The EU, of course, wants to secure its natural gas supply and it 
faces three geostrategic challenges: First, how to structure the relations with Russia, 
second is will Iran be integrated into the international political system and a global 
economy, third will Turkey become a member of the European Union? However, at 
the same time EU wants to diminish the economic and political dependence on 
energy resource imports. 
     Until the 1990s, most European energy suppliers had been controlled by the 
different individual states. Electricite de France -the state owned French company 
focuses on nuclear energy. Climate protection and the promotion of renewable 
energy play an important role in the Germany, and Poland gets most of its 
electricity and heating power from hard coal, Baltic States depend on gas imports 
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from Russia. European states such as- Netherland and Germany try to make an 
excellent business with energy of Russia. However, in its turn Russian Gazprom 
also has entered the German gas distribution. German France and Italy governments 
are transforming their formerly state-owned companies into competitive national 
champions. Especially in Germany, such companies have maintained their territorial 
monopolies. Germany, without any participations, arranges its energy supply with 
Russia and wants to become the hub for energy imports from Russia to Western part 
of Europe. This policy is actually has been initiated by the federal government of 
Angela Merkel. German companies wish to become a key political position in the 
EU and Russia relationships and it makes unhappy Poland and the Baltic States for 
this fact.  
     The European Energy Charter was signed in 1994, December. It considered a 
basic treaty for a common pan-European energy policy and its main objectives are 
the creation of a regime of energy management, which is based on the principles of 
market economy, the regulation of trade, investment in the energy area and 
mediation in any disputes. It should be found a balance between different interests 
of energy exporters. The investment and business interests of the private energy 
industry also have to be protected. During the implementation of interests of the 
economy and the investors, the other objectives of European Union energy policy 
should not be forgotten. Primarily the protection of the environment and climate 
includes to these objectives.40 
       All European States, and Russia, Australia and Japan also are the members of 
the European Energy Charter. During the beginning of the 1990s, the first version of 
the Charter was formulated. The objective of formulation such energy community 
of the countries based on the complementarities of the Western markets, technology 
and natural resources of the Eastern states. However, the Charter was not ratified by 
the Russia. Russia criticized The Transit Protocol- which is the part of the Energy 
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Charter with the aim that, Russian parliament made Gazprom the only exporter of 
Russian gas. Nevertheless, the EU wants to have option of purchasing gas directly 
from Central Asian exporters, such as from Turkmenistan and to transport it via the 
Russian network. Interrupting the energy transport where a dispute before the 
international mediation process has not been adjudicated, it will be outlawed in 
future according to Charter. 
For the energy imports from Russia to the Europe, Ukraine is the main transit 
country. European energy policy cannot be complete without the participation of 
Ukraine. Ukraine itself also depends on Russian gas imports and as well as other 
CIS states, Turkmenistan the most important being. Ukraine imported 80% of the 
natural gas from Russia and from Central Asia via the Russian pipelines.  There is a 
huge gap in front of Ukraine- whether to integrate into the domestic energy market 
of the EU, or to remain in the pressure or domination of Gazprom and the Kremlin. 
Now Ukraine needs outside help to invest in its dilapidated energy infrastructure 
and to reduce its dependence from the Russian imports. To make Ukraine part of the 
trans-European energy network and common domestic market is according to the 
interests of Ukraine. Because European Union with Ukraine on its side could act 
more confidently towards Russia. 41 
   European Union have been many desire to formulate a common energy policy. 
However, it was only limited success. The reluctance of member states to pool 
sovereignty in this policy area was the main reason of the failure of its success. The 
integrated European economy, international competition, the common challenges of 
the environment and the increased activism of the Commission in the energy sector 
are the factors that would pull the energy policies of member states in the same 
direction and creating the basis for a truly European energy policy.  However, such 
kind of convergence is not yet a reality. 42 
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   Azerbaijan has no direct border with the European Union.  When the EU and 
Azerbaijan partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1996, and entered 
into force at 1999, it established the relations between them. The agreement stated 
that the both sides will get more benefit from the relations. The relations were 
strengthen when Azerbaijan become the 43rd state of join the Council of Europe, in 
2001, 25 January. It gave the opportunity to Azerbaijan to open itself even more to 
Europe and the West. In the areas of the political dialogue, the legal framework has 
provided trade, investment, economic, cultural and legislative cooperation, EU and 
Azerbaijan relations. A regular dialogue have been ensured at the political and 
technical level.  The key foreign policy of European Union toward its neighbours 
was The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and Azerbaijan has been covered 
by the ENP since its inception in 2004. IT showed the willingness of European 
Union to extent its cooperation with Azerbaijan, and the first attempt in this 
direction was publishing a Country Report assessing the progress in Azerbaijan 
towards economic and political reform. It showed the areas in which the 
cooperation between Azerbaijan and EU could be valuable strengthened. EU 
developed action plan in the context of ENP. Bilateral Action Plans, agreed between 
the European Union and each partner, and concentrate on concrete aims and actions 
to be achieved in the short time. Substantive Home Affairs elements, 
democratization, socio- economic reform, poverty, energy, conflicts issues, human 
rights, border management, migration, the struggle against organized crime and 
corruption, police operation were included the Action Plans.  Azerbaijan signed A 
Memorandum of Understanding in the context of the ENP Action Plan in 2006, 7 
November, which is aimed at establishing a partnership in the energy field. It 
represents an important step to strengthen Azerbaijan energy relations with 
European Union, and to help at the same time, to modernize and make efficient the 
domestic energy sector. Azerbaijan is also part of the Eastern Partnership, which 
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was established in May 2009 and deeper the current relations with European 
Union.43 
 The Russia and Ukraine gas crises in 2006, caused to the need supply away from 
Russia, through a Southern Gas Corridor that will supply 10- 20 % of European 
Union gas demand by 2020. The historical specialization of Azerbaijan in the 
energy security made Azerbaijan an attractive country for European Union and, 
Azerbaijan and European Union are good partners on energy policy. They are 
working together on different projects. To connect the Caspian oil supply to Europe 
is the main project, which is aimed to provide a viable route for oil and gas to reach 
consumers. The state sponsored program for the increasing the alternative and 
renewable energy resources of Azerbaijan have been supported by European Union. 
Azerbaijan is also a partner country of the EU INOGATE energy program. This 
program have four key topics, they are: to strength the energy security, unification 
of the  member states energy markets on the EU's basis of internal energy, market 
principles, supporting energy development and to attract the foreign investment for 
energy projects of common and regional interests.  European Union has energy 
interests in the cooperation with Azerbaijan, and relies on the external imports more 
than 70% of its energy supply by 2030. Barroso- the President of European 
Commission and Commissioner Oettinger visited several times with the related to 
negotiations for a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, to Baku, and the Agreement was 
signed in September 2011.  44 
  When Azerbaijan become an independent, it proclaimed the European integration 
as a priority in its foreign policy, and Azerbaijan began to develop its energy 
strategy, with main emphasis on diversification of the transit routes.  Heydar 
Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan Republic designed the energy strategy as a 
leading power in the economic development of Azerbaijan, and because of the 
effectiveness of this strategy, Azerbaijan attracted billions of dollars to Azerbaijani 
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economy. The most investment were challenged to the oil sector. Government took 
some measures to develop also the non-oil sector, and the most important attempts 
in this issue is to establishment of the State Oil Fund, at the same time the 
government is busy with the implementation different state programs on different 
social-economic problems. Today Azerbaijani economy is developed at 
unprecedented speed in the result of complex measures taken by the leadership of 
Ilham Aliyev.  These were possible due to the wisdom of Azerbaijan President 
Heydar Aliyev during 1990s with the signing of the Contract of Century in 1994 
and in 1996- the Contract for development of Shahdeniz gas field. After these 
issues, the volume of oil and gas increased into the world markets. During Soviet 
Union, Azerbaijan had been left with the legacy, that could deliver its oil into the 
world oil markets and were stretching northward, but it did not meet the required 
capacity of increasing volumes. For that reason, National Leader-Heydar Aliyev had 
taken a crucial decision of diversifying exportation routes and building new 
pipelines.  However, this decision was criticized in the market from different 
players. In spite of these difficulties, Azerbaijan and its partners has demonstrated 
their firm conviction in project. By these efforts, Azerbaijan and its partners created 
a new geography of pipeline infrastructure-that promotes the alternative supply and 
contributes to the regional markets integration in the European continent. This 
strategy was successful and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Novorosiysk, Baku-
Supsa pipelines and construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and oil 
shipments through rail to Batumi, are evident of that strategy. Therefore, Azerbaijan 
together with its partners in region developed a unique pipeline infrastructure that 
delivered directly from the Caspian Sea to Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea and 
guarantees on a competitive basis. 1, 3 trillion of gas reserves are only in Shahdeniz 
gas field, but the gas fields are estimated at 1.6 trillion cubic meters in the 
Azerbaijani fields, the gas is already exporting to Georgia and Turkey via Baku-
Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline. 45 
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      The political stability and economically development in the Southern Caucasus 
is in the strong interests of the EU. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the major 
obstacle to development of the overall regional stability. In the way of conducting, 
the dialogue between the EU and Caucasus region was the creation of the EU 
Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus position-, which held by the 
Swedish diplomat Ambassador Peter Semneby. It will help to the EU a developing 
policy towards the region and to support the conflict-prevention and peace-
settlement mechanisms in operation are includes into the mandate of the EU Special 
Representative for the Southern Caucasus. EU Special Representative works closely 
together with co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group for conflict settlement on 
Nagorno- Karabakh region.46 
       In future, Turkish-European gas demand will increase. A new route from 
Caspian region for energy resources opened by TAP project. (Trans-Adriatic- 
Pipeline) contest to move Azeri gas to Europe, crossing Northern Greece, Albania 
and the Adriatic Sea where it will connect to the Italian natural gas network. The 
route is 900 km long and capacity is 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year. This 
project is vital for Southern Gas Corridor and shareholders are large companies such 
as SOCAR, BP, Statoil, Axpo and Enagas. 47  
      Another important project is TANAP (Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline 
Project) which will be completed in 2018 with the 7 billion dollar investment. 
Eighty  percent of project is owned by SOCAR and 20 percent by Turkey, later BP 
also joined by splitting eighty percent of SOCAR. This pipeline will enable 
Azerbaijan to export its gas to through Georgia and Turkey to Europe without 
Russian and Iranian control and access to multiple buyers, transportation routes and 
pipelines. Because of this strategy, Azerbaijan and Georgia gained additional 
autonomy from Russia. Significance of TANAP is equal to BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-
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Ceyhan) oil pipeline, which will mark Azerbaijan’s emergence as a major and 
significant gas exporter and oil industry player in the region.  
      EU and Turkey being foreign-dependent about gas import, mainly from Russia 
made this project compulsory. Becoming a transit hub is the best option for political 
and economic interests of Turkey. Turkey worries about the increasing need of gas 
and via TANAP wants to break its gas dependency of Russia and Iran.  Therefore, 
TANAP represents both Azerbaijan and Turkey’s interests.48 TANAP has some 
implications: first, it will allow greater volumes of imported energy are regulates 
under Western regulatory regimes. Western rules on construction, will led to 
competition and distribution of market. It will develop economic, social and 
political institutions in participant states. Second, this project will weaken the 
dominant mechanism of Gazprom by the contribution of non-Russian gas supplies. 
TANAP is considered only a small step for EU energy goal, but important step 
toward developing the southern gas corridor. It will expand EU regulatory norms to 
the Caspian and accelerate bilateral natural gas policy. Turkmen president 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov also stressed the willingness of his country on 
participation in this project.  However, Turkmenistan’s dependence on its bilateral 
relations with Russia and the conflict over legal status of Caspian Sea between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan may delay the second step of the project. Delays of 
the construction of the pipelines is of benefit to Russia, since the project would 
undermine the Russian energy monopoly over Europe. (32)49 Azerbaijan is ready to 
offer a multi system of oil and gas pipelines and other opportunities for 
Turkmenistan to implementation of projects. Joining of Turkmenistan to TANAP 
gas pipeline project can add economic feasibility to this project. Thus, TANAP will 
bring Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia and Turkmenistan closer and will pave the way 
for further projects in future. (33) 50 
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   Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan is also one of the key player in the Caspian region 
with its energy resources. EU as in other strategic places also wants to find its place 
in Turkmenistan. However, the relations of EU with Central Asian states have until 
recently remained limited. There were some reasons such as: the absence of general 
long lasting strategy, the inability of Brussels to make direct economic and political 
objectives and the failure of different programs, and leaving the image of a 
bureaucratic institution, made relations costly, difficult and ineffective. 
   A partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Turkmenistan and EU has 
been signed in 1998, May. However, it was not ratified by the EU Parliament and a 
number of EU states. Then, bilateral relations developed through the 
implementation of Technical aid to the CIS.  
After Independence, Turkmenistan stood apart also from the other States of Central 
Asia, and isolated itself from them. The reforms about liberalization of economy 
was not effective and the government gave attention to the development of private 
sector.  Actually, then political regime was created by the Niyazov. Turkmenistan 
has rich energy reserves and of course, government could provide its population 
with subsidized goods and sometimes Turkmenistan referred to " Sultanistic", while 
other Central Asian states' political system were classified as authoritarian. In 2006, 
after the death of lifelong President-Saparmurad Niyazov, the relaxation of the 
isolation began.  Under the presidency of Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, the 
country passed a partial normalization process. Berdymukhamedov visited Brussels 
during 2007.  During his visit, he met with high-ranking officials of EU and after 5 
months in April 2008, the European Commission (Benita Ferrero European Union 
External Relations Commissioner) opened the Europa House in Ashgabat in 2008. 
Turkmenistan became opening up to the world and some sufferable policies and 
laws were revoked. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan remained state-controlled economy. 
Turkmenistan still classifies as not free, highly authoritarian. Because of that, it is 
not very comfortable partner for the European Union. 
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 As we know, Turkmenistan has vast natural gas resources and keen on increasing 
its huge volume gas to Europe. The relations with the EU in terms of energy 
cooperation are according to the interests of both sides. In 2008, Turkmenistan and 
the EU signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the energy cooperation 
field. This Memorandum recognized the important strategic role and the 
development of Turkmenistan in the energy sector. According to this Memorandum, 
both sides began to strength the security of energy supply.  It also stated that both 
sides will exchange the information, to create conditions for the investment in the 
Turkmenistan energy sector and to develop the infrastructure of the energy 
transportation. In 2007, March 8-9 in the conclusion of the meeting of the Brussels 
European Council, the importance of strengthening cooperation between EU and the 
Central Asian states and the Caspian region in the energy field was underlined. EU 
is also interested cooperation with Turkmenistan in terms of human rights. Other 
interest was to socialize Turkmenistan into Western norms. The government in 
Turkmenistan is averse to foreign influence. Therefore, the assistance of the 
European Union to this country is minimal. EU allocated €22 million (10 per cent) 
of its budget to Turkmenistan, for bilateral programs. The energy sector, rural 
development and promotion of civil society were the main points in the assistance 
program. In 2007, EU saw an adoption of a "Strategy for a New Partnership with 
Central Asia», this strategy signals an evolution and perception of European Union 
what needs to be achieved. Turkmenistan is also interested in the investment of EU 
in the energy sector of state. According to the document both sides agreed that there 
is, an essential potential for cooperation and it also specified each Central Asian 
states and identified strategic priorities such as: rule of law, education common 
security issues and the protection of environment. These priorities  
combined the regional and bilateral approaches, and the policy of EU toward 
Central Asia became a full part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union. Current projects of European Union in Turkmenistan focus on- 
Education and capacity building, economic reforms, promotion of civil society, 
agriculture and rural development, market and regulatory reforms good governance 
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and rule of law. However, sometimes, experts think that, Turkmenistan just use 
Brussels as a kind of puppet towards Russia in its policy. 51 
     Azerbaijan is the main energy projects initiator in the region and Turkmenistan is 
capable to provide European market. The development of new routes via Azerbaijan 
is necessary in this case. Iran and Russia are main obstacle to any deal between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Russia wants to withdraw Turkmenistan from this 
project. Russia and Europe compete over Turkmen gas. Another obstacle is 
associated with the legal status of the sea. 
 
2.3 Impact of regional states on Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan bilateral relations: 
Russia, Turkey and Iran 
  
  Caucasus is unstable region with ethnic conflicts and it increased the geopolitical 
competition among Russia, Turkey, and Iran. Russia has traditionally been the key 
actor on the Eurasian energy map. It has the world's eighth largest crude oil 
reserves, and 48 trillion cubic meters natural gas reserves. Today the foreign policy 
of Russia is focused on its increasing prestige and supporting its economic growth 
as well as to demonstrate power to keep Russia secure. The government seeks to 
enlarge the influence of Russia internationally, because of that other states are 
forced to limit their influence and power. Moscow also worries about the instability 
of the countries, which are neighbour of it, because the political change in those 
states can involve Russia in violent unrest. Russian involvement in Asia and the 
Middle East focuses on increasing its international prestige and building economic 
relations. In this field China is a big and key partner of Russia in spite of residual 
distrust on both sides. The relations with USA also was not so warm in recent years, 
as Russia fells that USA wants to diminish its prestige and power  in the 
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international arena. Russian and EU relations are bounded most of for trade 
relations. However, these relations have often been tense in the recent years, and 
Russia began to focus its efforts on building bilateral relations with important states 
in EU, perhaps most successfully with Germany, and Turkey outside the Europe. 52 
 Ten years after collapse of Soviet Union, in 2001 Russia had come a long way to 
define the key direction of its foreign policy towards West and Europe. In the 
Russian approach to the Caucasus have been always dominated by the military 
security. Because conflict in the one of the Caucasian republics can easily spill over 
in another part of regions because of cultural and ethnic issues.   Russia has been 
dominated Caspian region since the 19th century and this region is actually still in 
the interests of Russia, and Caspian want and seek to withdraw from its shadow. 53 
    Turkey is a traditional and key geopolitical rival of Russia in the Caucasus and 
Central Asian region. However, the decline of the former forces of the Soviet Union 
in the Caucasus changed the balance of forces in favour of the Turkey. Strong 
Turkish air forces and Field Army based at Erzurum, across the Turkish border. 
Joint exercises with Armenia and Russian air defence agreements is principally 
directed at Turkish potential threat. Turkish potential alliance with Azerbaijan and 
Georgia intended to supply a geostrategic counterbalance to Russia. Russia, from 
this perspective has viewed Turkish proposals to supply troops for an OSCE forces 
in Nagorno- Karabakh with suspicion. For Russian nationalists Turkey is also 
characterizes as the leading power of the Turkic people seeking ascendancy over the 
Central Asian States. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have also discussed technical 
assistance and military training with Turkey. Azerbaijan signed a declaration- 
"Deepened Strategic Cooperation" with Turkey in 1997, May.  The President of 
Azerbaijan Republic, Heyder Aliyev proposed Turkish military to extend the 
protection of pipeline security in the Caucasus. Russia also alarmed over Turkish 
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and Ukrainian military cooperation. Therefore, Moscow wants to normalization 
relations with the Ankara in the regions, in terms of its security issues. 54 
 Energy is a fundamental way to rise of Russia. Possession of huge oil and gas 
resources fulfils a similar function to its nuclear weapons in the soviet era.  The 
boom in the world oil prices has undermined Russian's re-emergence as a great 
power in 1999. According to Russian politicians, energy is not simply as an 
instrument of influence in itself, but as increasing other powers such as military, 
political, economic, technological, cultural and soft power.  
  Central Asia have always been for Russia area in which it has traditionally enjoyed 
essential political advantage and economic influence. Russia thought to maintain its 
influence directly through economic and bilateral contracts with these states by 
building regional organizations such as Commonwealth of Independent States, 
(CIS). Another one Eurasian Economic Community was established in 2000 but had 
little practical relevance. A regional military alliance- Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, signed in 2002, by Russia, and Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The integral part of Russia’s efforts to maintain its 
dominance in the region, has been energy. These states wanted to open up to the 
global market. However, being the part of the Soviet Union their energy sectors are 
still integrated with Russian production and pipeline networks. 55 
  Iran and Russia insist that before building any pipelines, Caspian Sea must first be 
delineated. There have no agreement among all the Caspian Sea, just a series of 
bilateral treaties between littoral states. There are also disputes if the Caspian Sea is 
lake or a sea.  A trans-Caspian link would weaken Russian control of Caspian 
energy and undermine its ability to block direct gas shipments from Turkmenistan 
to the EU. That is why Russia opposes to pipelines, which link Azerbaijan, 
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Turkmenistan and EU. However, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have disputes over 
an offshore gas field, between these states, which called Kyapaz by Azerbaijan and 
Serdar by Turkmenistan. It has been thought by some observes that Turkmenistan 
becomes more active in trying to remove the obstacles to a trans-Caspian link, 
which would be a departure from the country's stance of selling gas at the border. It 
also appears that Turkmenistan is still concerned about the reaction of Russia to 
force the issue to the possible gas contract with European companies.  
  The emergence of the newly independent states after the collapse of Soviet Union 
was a painful process for Russia. For preserve, its position in the south Caucasus, 
Russia's diplomatic role in the Nagorno- Karabakh has been an essential for Russia. 
Azerbaijan has lost its seven districts: Lachin, Kelbajar, Fuzuli, Agdam, Jebrail, 
Gubadly, and Zengilan, during the war, which happened in 1992-1993. There is one 
reality that Karabakh is no longer under Azerbaijan's control. This conflict 
continues with an uneasy cease-fire that breaks down intermittently. However, 
actually the roots of conflict is deep. Armenians, who live in the Karabakh do not 
want to re-join Azerbaijan. None of Azeri leader have yet been concede the loss of 
Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia became dependent on Russia for its security, after 
owing to the conflict with Azerbaijan. CIS members supported desire of Russia to 
dominate mediation and peacekeeping in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In 1993, 
June, Russia withdrew its troops from Azerbaijan, but kept in Armenia. Russia and 
Armenia signed an agreement in 1995. This treaty formalized Russia's deployment 
and basing rights at Gyumri and Yerevan. Russia's troops are estimated nearly 
12,000 to 15,000, that stayed in Armenia across the borders from Turkey and Iran. 
Armenia and Russia signed a comprehensive security treaty in 1997, August, which 
supersedes the previous one, signed in December 1991.  This new document 
provides "mutual assistance", the coordination of defence production, and not to 
join to treaties or alliances with another party. The provisions of the treaty creates 
the closer alignment sought by Russia. It creates a security relationship, which also 
includes joint military manoeuvres. Russian continuing economic aid and closer to 
Armenia than that with any other state. Azerbaijani leaders criticized it as a hostile 
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act. Armenia’s dependence from Russia and the security treaty between them 
strengthen the position of Russia in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan has also realized that 
Russia is not just force but also the dominant one in the region. Russia signed a 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security with Azerbaijan in 1997, 
July. However, it does not provide for mutual assistance in the event of war, 
coordinate defence policies or arms supplies of Russia as was in the treaty between 
Armenia and Russia. It again shows that, Russia is aware of the rising strategic and 
economic significance of Azerbaijan. The importance of territorial integrity was 
noted in the treaty. Russia is also a member of OSCE "Minsk Group" in which with 
United States and France seeking to settle the Nagorno- Karabakh dispute and never 
endorsed that Nagorno-Karabakh should be allowed to join Armenia.  Russian role 
in OSCE, Minsk Group efforts is to protect its interests and not to harm them while 
decisions taken by the organization is important for Russia. Russia wants that, its 
troops be as the sole members of the peacekeeping force in Nagorno- Karabakh. 
However, Azerbaijan rejected it in the negotiations that preceded the cease -fire in 
1994. Turkey and USA supported the insistence of Azerbaijan on a multinational 
force. According to the decision of OSCE to assemble, a peacekeeping force 
stipulated that no more than 30 percent from the member state soldiers. Russia yet 
wants to attempt for dominating diplomacy and peacekeeping in these areas. It 
shows again that Russia has special interests that Russian led CIS contingents, 
which Azerbaijan joined in 1993, should conduct the peacekeeping there. According 
to OSCE's decision on peacekeeping, it suggested that Russia would have to settle 
its fall-back position. In 1997, in the summer, the Minsk Group set a plan that 
Armenian troop withdrawal from the Azerbaijani district, which were occupied by 
Armenia, returning Azeri refugees to their lands, to reduce the size of Armenian 
forces in the Karabakh, and to give autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh within 
Azerbaijan. However, it was rejected by the Karabakh Armenians.  
    Russian foreign policy toward Central Asian States is ambitious, in the recent 
years.  During the third term presidency of V. Putin, started new approach towards 
these states and it increased the interest of Russia to assert presence in these areas. 
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Especially, during the last two years Russia showed its interest to restore its 
dominance over Central Asian States.  It was seen from Central Asian States as a 
sphere of Russian dominance. However, this perception is not new for them, they 
have been seen it even before the independence. 56 
  The long-lasting changes for the country and its people began after the arrival of 
the tsarist empire in the Turkmenistan.  The colonial domination of Russia was 
relatively short, nearly half a century but it effectively helped people to face with 
modernizing European culture. Russia, wanted to keep its military influence in 
Turkmenistan, particularly along the former southern border of the Soviet Union 
with Afghanistan and Iran. After independence, however, Ashgabat announced the 
creation of its own border troops in order to prevent the Russian presence, but at the 
same time, it was hard to establish an efficient army in such short time. According 
to a first bilateral agreement, between two countries, which has been signed in 1992, 
placed all border units under Russian-Turkmen leadership for five years period, and 
Russia contributed financially, for the development of the borders of Turkmenistan. 
After 1994, this unified command was abolished. However, Moscow maintained a 
representative in the Defence Ministry of Turkmenistan and another representative 
in the National Security Council.  Turkmenistan, until this date has hosted 
approximately 15,000 soldiers under joint Russian-Turkmen command. They were 
charged with guarding the with Iran and Afghanistan borders. Numbering between 
2000 and 3000 men, a group of special operation forces from Russia were tasked for 
the land and maritime borders protection. For to support the Turkmen troops, an 
operational group of Russian border soldiers were created, but two-thirds of these 
military personnel left the country, because of the rapid worsened diplomatic 
relations between Russia and Turkmenistan.  
   Diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkmenistan were chaotic during 
1990s. Declarations of independence, which the Turkmenbashi levied against "big 
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brother" was unacceptable for Russia. Niyazov wanted to divert gas exports outside 
of Russian networks. However, Kremil neither politically nor physically eliminated 
him several times. Economic relations between them based primarily on 
hydrocarbons. Because of protectionist policies of Turkmenistan, trade in food 
products was limited. Russia remains one of the main customers of Turkmen cotton 
exports. After the Agreement with Gazprom, relations between them developed 
after 2003 April. In 2007 bilateral relations between Russia and Turkmenistan 
developed, with the change of regime in Turkmenistan. President 
Berdymuhammedov, in contrast to his predecessor, tried to restore the place of 
Russia in the Turkmen foreign policy. Energy cooperation was developed and 
Russian companies benefited from the bilateral relations and began to invest in the 
Turkmen market. The construction sector has also developed and ITERA got a 
contract to construct a ten-thousand stadium in Turkmenabat and construction 
projects in the tourist zone of Avaza.  In 2009, March, Turkmenistan, for the 
purpose to export vegetables and fruit, and to develop its textile trade there, opened 
an air link with Saint Petersburg. Cultural relations also developed; under the rule of 
Niyazov these relations were no existed. Russian language regained its place within 
Turkmen universities and schools. 57 
Turkmenistan is even more dependent on Russia for export channels, which has the 
world's third largest natural gas reserves. The pipelines, that Turkmenistan needs to 
export gas, are controls by Gazprom, and for the upkeep of its natural gas 
infrastructure, Turkmenistan relies on Gazprom specialists. Turkmenistan formed a 
joint company in 1995 with Gazprom, which called Turkmenrosgaz to retrain access 
to Gazprom's expertise. In 1997, when it terminated the venture, head of Gazprom 
announced that he was ready to give "up entirely" on Turkmenistan, a serious 
development considering the extent of its dependence on the pipelines of the 
company and technical expertise.  Turkmenistan has been trying to develop pipeline 
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routes, like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan that would ease its predicament. However, 
the mix of financial and political factors make the outlook uncertain. A gas pipeline 
from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and on to India is one possibility. Unocal, 
Delta, (Saudi Arabia) the Turkmen government and different companies from 
Japan, Pakistan and South Korea formed a consortium in 1997, October. It lead by 
Unocal and called Central Asia Gas Pipeline limited that Gazprom was expected to 
join. In December 1998, the construction began and end in 2001 with a 1, 271 km 
pipeline to Multan in Pakistan, an extension to India was also envisaged. The 
leaders of Turkmenistan have also spoken about a gas pipeline through Kyrgyzstan 
and China to Japan. However, it has much higher cost.  Through Iran and on to 
Turkey is another possible export route. In April, 1995, it has been signed 
agreement between them and Iran agreed to fund  a 287 km pipeline from the 
Korpedzhe fields in western Turkmenistan to Kord Kuy in northern part of Iran and 
link it with the existing 1000 km line running west across northern part of Iran into 
Turkey. Turkey agreed to purchase 28 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas a year 
via the Iranian pipeline in 1997, April. However, sending of Turkmen gas from 
Turkey to Western Europe is sceptical for experts because of political and financial 
reasons. Therefore, when it comes to the question of getting the Caspian oil and gas 
to market no matter which, Russia remains an important player. 58 
        Because of earlier Ottoman Empire ideas and ethnic Turkish link, Turkey 
consider itself as a central player in the geopolitical issues in South Caucasus and 
Central Asia. Being a transit country in the East and West corridor Turkey wishes to 
get more benefit. Its independence from Russia and Iran helps Turkey to get support 
from USA. Turkish policies even were criticized for being to follow the footsteps of 
global power-USA. Turkish position in Middle East, Iraq war, Caucasus, Cyprus are 
example for that. USA wants to diminish the power of Iran and Russia in the region. 
The principle of Turkey in the Caucasus region is to protect the territorial integrity 
and independence of the newly independent states. Because the emergence of these 
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states has created new opportunities for Turkey. After Cold War, Turkey began to 
establish closer relations with the region, especially with Azerbaijan. Caspian 
energy development was one of the main objectives of Turkey in the relations. 
Turkey also did many diplomatic efforts to promote the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 
project, which exports the Azerbaijani oil to western market. Another policy is to 
make joint action with Western allies and international organizations.  
   Russia of course, is uncomfortable with new active foreign policy of Turkey 
toward Azerbaijan and Central Asian Turkic republics, which is based on pan-
Turkism, which increases the influence of Turkey in the region. This conflict also 
goes back to the expansion of Russia in the Caucasus at the expense of Ottomon 
Empire. Now Russia wants to regain its dominance over the former Soviet Union's 
territories. It increase the conflict between Turkey and Russia. Because, Russia 
wants to limit influence and power of Turkey in the region. Military cooperation 
between Russia and Armenia on the border of Turkey caused the expansion of 
military ties of Turkey and Azerbaijan.  The rival relations and competition policies 
between two states are actually characterized regarding on geostrategic and security 
issues in the region, but they also have commercial and trade relations, and these 
relations are expanded. After collapse of Soviet, union Turkey became one of the 
major trading partners of Russia.  Russia imports foods and consumer goods from 
Turkey. Turkish trading companies and construction firms caused strong business 
relations between two states. Russian lobby in Turkey also has strong influence on 
political relations of these countries. Geopolitical, economical and commercial 
concerns are shaping the key policy of Turkey toward Russia.   59 
    For Turkey, another geopolitical and regional rival is Iran. None of them trusts 
each other and see other’s effort as to gain political and economic influence in the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia. Iran is apprehensive about the close political 
economic and cultural relationships of Turkey and Azerbaijan in the region. When 
Elçibəy openly announced pro-Turkish and anti-Iran policy, Iran worried that it 
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could change the regional balance to its disadvantage. Turkey also worried that the 
influence of Iran in Azerbaijan could cause an obstacle to pursue its economic and 
political interests. These perceptions continue to shape their regional policies and 
behaviours. 60 
     Turkey and Iran despite of periodic crises and geopolitical rivalries in their 
relations have expanded their economic and commercial relations. According to 
Turkey, Iran is the important market for its exports. At the same time Iran, also see 
Turkey as the potential market for its gas and petroleum products as well as a cheap 
market for import of manufactured goods and consumer products.  
     After the collapse of Soviet Union, and the emergence of newly independent 
Turkic Republics, gave opportunity to Turkey, wanted to expand its regional role 
and to establish political, economic and cultural relations with them. During Cold 
War, these relations did not exist. The new policies and relations in the region made 
political sharpness among regional rivalries such as Russia, Iran and Turkey. During 
1990s, Turkey noticed the relative weakness of Russia in the region and began to 
cooperate with Azerbaijan and Georgia militarily within NATO. Actually, Turkey 
has no the same relations with these three countries. Azerbaijan is considered a 
small brother, Georgia is strategic gateway to the Central Asia and Caucasus, and 
relations with Armenia is officially hostile. 61 
     In the south Caucasus, Azerbaijan is important country for Turkey, first, because 
it was the only Turkic Caucasus state, which is situated on the Caspian Sea it was 
important for Turkey to access to Central Asia, second, for its energy resources. 
Because of that, Turkey had some priorities in the policy toward Azerbaijan. They 
are: to protect the independence and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, to support the 
sovereignty of Azerbaijan over Karabakh, to prevent a Russian return to the region 
again, to participate joint oil projects and to export Azerbaijani oil through Turkey 
                                                          
60 Carlo Frappi, Reshad Karimov, Azad Garibov,  The Caspian Sea Chessboard: Geo-political, geo-strategic and 
geo-economic analysis,  (Milano, 2014) 226-227 
61 Robert Ebel, Rjan Menon, Energy and Conflicts in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ( USA, 2000) 225-226,238 
 
66 
 
and of course, and  to preserve a friendly relations with Azerbaijan. On November 
9, 1991, Turkey was the first country, which recognized the independence of 
Azerbaijan.  After independence, it was predicted that the ties with Azerbaijan and 
Turkey will develop in the best way. When Elçibey was elected as a president, he 
chose a "Turkish model" of governance and he had strongly anti-Iranian views. At 
the same time, he had no political tactics and Turkey saw him as a destabilizing 
factor and unfitting govern, as well as it hindered Turkey's regional objectives. 
During those times Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey had a warmer relations with 
Heydar Aliyev, who still was in Nakhichevan.  However, nationalist faction in 
Turkey strongly supported Elçibey. In June, the government of Elçibey was ousted 
and this process was in favour of Russia.  Of course, the fall of Elçibey meant the 
end of the "Turkish model". During that time, Turkey actively involved to bring 
Heydar Aliyev to power.  Demirel also supported Heydar Aliyev and prompted 
Elçibey to ask him to come to Baku. He invited Heydar Aliyev to stabilize the 
situation in the country. Ankara wanted to put Moscow's plan, to put Surat 
Huseynov, insurgent commander, in power in the place of Elçibey in obstacle. 
However, Heyder Aliyev was smarter and unlike Elçibey, he did not give a 
principle priority to Turkey and kept relations with Turkey according to his 
purposes.  Turkey also feared that Aliyev might become closer to Russia and to lose 
relations with Azerbaijan meant to lose the access to Central Asia and energy 
resources of Caspian Sea. It meant too much risk for Turkey. Nevertheless, the 
relations strengthened due to mutual trust.  Heydar Aliyev also tried to show that 
not only Azerbaijan that needed Turkey, Turkey also needed Azerbaijan. In 1995, in 
the Turkish Parliament Heydar Aliyev stated "We are one nation but two states". 
Aliyev was a great strategist and he developed good relations with other countries 
as well while keeping close relations with Turkey. 62 
     From 1994, because of Karabakh conflict, Turkey woke up from its Turkic 
euphoria because its inability to influence to this conflict and it weakened Turkish 
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dominant role in the region. Initially, Turkey began to be a mediator of two parts, 
but when Armenian military advances intensified on Azerbaijani territories, Turkey 
stand more on the Azerbaijani side. During this time, Turkish press criticised 
government for being mild toward Armenian side.  Turkey closed its borders with 
Armenia in 1993, April.  Since 1994 after cease-fire, when Azerbaijan lost 
Karabakh, the policy of Turkey toward Armenia has been tied to policy of 
Azerbaijan towards Armenia. Turkey also with Azerbaijan, decided to keep away 
Armenia in the regional integration processes, regional projects and its access to 
western markets via Turkey. Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline was the most important loss 
for Armenia. Because of these issues, Armenian economy became depended on Iran 
and Russia, people began to leave the country since 1989.  
    On the other hand, Azerbaijan does not recognize the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, because of Nagorno Karabakh, others also may recognize the 
Karabakh region apart from Azerbaijan.  As Azerbaijan may choose to send its oil 
via alternative route such as via Russia and Iran, Turkey soften its policy toward 
Azerbaijan because in this case Turkey's foreign policy and interests in the region 
may be damaged. Turkish leadership was encouraged by USA in order to prevent 
further regional polarization. Actually, there are two axes, which were formed in the 
region: First, Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia-United States, and second, Armenia-
Russia-Iran.  
       Turkey allowed flights to Armenia to pass from Turkish airspace. In spite of 
that, the relations between them became more strained. The resolutions to recognize 
"Armenian genocide" of 1915 were introduced to European parliaments and in the 
USA Congress by Armenian diaspora. Turkey consider that, the economic relations 
are favour to Armenia but Armenia does not want peace in the region and will never 
break off relations with Russia and Iran. According to Turkey, many international 
efforts are also in favour of Armenia for example: The Co-Chairs of OSCE Minsk 
Group, which are, consist of US, France and Russia. Turkey and Azerbaijan argue 
that Armenia has strategic political relations with Russia and Armenia's diaspora 
has strong influence in Paris and Washington, so this group is favour of Armenia. 
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However, Turkey's involvement in this group was rejected as it has been seen too 
pro-Azerbaijani.  
    Caspian region is important for Turkey, as it is the key link between Central Asia 
and Turkey.  Oil and gas resources made it more essential region for Turkey.  After 
the collapse of USSR Western interests to oil and gas resources of this region has 
been grown. Of course, it also connected with the demand for energy and economic 
growth of western countries. In other side, the exploitation of energy resources of 
Caucasus and Central Asia can cause the opening up them to new foreign 
investments and international cooperation. In this case, Turkey is considered one of 
the most important market of the Caspian region for oil and gas production. 
Turkey's main goal of its energy policy is to become hub for the transport of oil and 
gas in the region.  There are strategic important regional projects, such as: Baku -
Tbilisi- Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline and 
Baku-Tbilisi -Kars Railway Project between Azerbaijan and Turkey. 63 
   The reasons of Turkey supporting Baku- Tbilisi -Ceyhan were geopolitical, 
environmental and economic reasons. This pipeline transports crude oil 1, 776 km 
from Caspian Sea, Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil field to the Mediterranean Sea.  In 
Azerbaijan, the length of pipeline is 440 km long, in Georgia is 260 km and in 
Turkey is 1076 km long. It is considered the second longest oil pipeline after 
Russian Druzhba pipeline which transports oil to EU.  Construction began in 
September 2002. However, the officially pipeline was opened in 2005 May. Oil had 
started to flow through pipeline by May 26 and reached Ceyhan on May 28, 2006. 
The transportation of Caspian energy actually was a political manoeuvre. It was 
competition among producing states, neighbouring states and western oil companies 
including USA wanted to influence the choice of the routing new pipelines. In this 
term, Turkey began actively to pursue the Baku- Tbilisi- Ceyhan pipeline project, 
which transport Azerbaijani main crude oil to world markets.  This construction also 
intertwined the political and economic competition between Turkey Iran and 
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Russia.  According to Turkey, the construction of this pipeline has been political 
and strategic superiority of the country and its position as an energy transit country 
between Caspian Basin and western markets. This pipeline from Azerbaijan through 
Georgia to Turkey also could establish closer ties with these states and brought 
positive economic advantages to the development of region. The political and 
military elites in Turkey has seen this project as an effective mechanism and great 
national prestige.  
    The President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Abdullah Gul signed the 
«Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance» in 2010. A  "Joint 
Statement on the establishment of High Level Strategic Cooperation Council" was 
signed between the President Ilham Aliyev and the Prime Minister of Turkey- Mr. 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the 10th Summit of the Heads of States of Turkic-
Speaking Countries, which held in Istanbul, 2010, September 15-16. These 
documents developed and consolidated the further bilateral relations between two 
countries. Under the chair of the President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of 
Turkey Reccep Tayyip Erdogan, the first and second meeting of the High Level 
Strategic Cooperation Council between two countries were held in Izmir in 2011, 
October25, and in Gabala in 2012, September 11. The third meeting held in Ankara, 
in 2013 on November 13. During meeting, all aspects of bilateral relations were 
discussed and reviewed. Several agreements were signed and concerning the 
decisions which have been taken at the meeting was signed the Joint Statement. In 
the efforts of OSCE Minsk Group Turkey, wants actively participate to make an 
appropriate platform for achieving the solution of Nagorno -Karabakh conflict and 
believes that the creative initiatives will overcome the today's deadlock in the peace 
process.  64 
      There were some aspects, which affected to these relations such as: historical, 
cultural and linguistic links between Azerbaijan and Turkey.  Turkey have always 
                                                          
64 Richard Weitz, Turkey-Azerbaijan Summit Consummates Reconciliation, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute& Silk 
Road Studies Program Joint Center, (2012) 
 
70 
 
expressed strong support to Nagorno- Karabakh issue. The expression- “One nation- 
Two States " which is used  by both sides,  is also evidence of strong relations. 
Cooperation is actually is focused on political economic and strategic interests, 
actually to the opposed to Russia, especially in the oil and gas field.   In terms of 
military cooperation, both countries are close partners. 65 
   Turkey was one of the first countries, which recognized the independence of 
Turkmenistan and opened its Embassy in Ashgabat. Because of common history, 
religion, culture, language factors, two states have close and special relations.  The 
main cooperation fields between them are: trade, economy, foreign policy, 
education and culture. The high-level visits have developed the relations between 
Turkey and Turkmenistan in 2012. The twice visit of the President of Turkmenistan 
Berdymukhamedov to Turkey brought the two states together in different projects 
and plans for investment.  The agenda of the visit was included the priority events 
of interstate cooperation and its further possibility diversification. During his 
official visit, Berdymukhamedov was decorated with the State Medal of Turkey. 
The President of Turkey, Gul presented the highest medal of Turkey and declared 
president Berdymukhamedov to be the President of Turkey's sister country.  
Abdullah Gul also officially visited Turkmenistan in 2013, May 29-31. During a 
tete-a-tete meeting, their views on the regional and international issues were 
exchanged and bilateral relations between two states were reviewed. Various 
agreements were signed during visit to further deepen cooperation between them. 
Berdymukhamedov introduced the State Medal of Turkmenistan to Abdulla Gul. He 
also received an Honorary Professorship Medal of Turkmenistan Institute of 
Economics and Management. 
    Approximately 600 Turkish companies were registered in Turkmenistan since the 
early years of its independence and from Central Asian states, the most projects by 
Turkish companies undertook in Turkmenistan. Turkish companies assumed more 
than 34 billion USD after the Turkmenistan's independence until today. Turkish 
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active private involvement areas are included-construction sector, textile and 
tourism sector. In 2012, the bilateral trade rapidly increased and reached at 3.5 
billion USD.  In humanitarian field the relations between two countries is developed 
each year a lot of Turkmen citizens travel to Turkey for trade and tourism and 
numerous Turkmen students get university education in Turkey.  Approximately 10 
thousand Turkish citizens live and work in Turkmenistan. These relations build an 
important bridge between Turkey and Turkmenistan and of course their people. The 
cost of construction projects, which were carried by Turkey in Turkmenistan since 
the early 2013, is 10. 2 billion dollars.  
Turkey has a great willingness to bring Turkmen gas to Turkey. The current gas 
supplier of Turkey is Russia. Turkey wants to add Turkmenistan and Iran to the list. 
In December 1996, Turkish, Iranian and Turkmen ministers met in Tehran and 
discussed the possible ways of transfer Turkmen and Iranian gas to Turkey. 
Ministers signed a letter of understanding about the gas need of Ankara and export 
of Turkmen and Iranian gas to Europe through Turkey.  Iranian president received 
them, Hashemi in 1996, December the cooperation of these three states are 
according to their national interests.  During Turkish minister Recai Kutan's second 
visit to Turkmenistan, he met with Saparmurad Niyazov and said that the aim of his 
visit is to bring Turkmenistan rich natural gas to Turkey. A memorandum was 
signed by Niyazov, Demirel and Hashemi to construct a gas pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Europe in Ashgabat, on May. In 1997, December, Mesut Yilmaz, 
the Prime Minister of Turkey made visit to Ashgabat, and held talks with the 
President Saparmurad. They confirmed their willingness to build a pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Turkey and a memorandum on mutual understanding for building a 
pipeline, which will run from Turkmenistan to Turkey and then to Europe was 
legalized and was signed by energy ministers of these countries.  Thus, the project 
of Trans Caspian route to transfer Turkmen gas to Turkey and Europe market was 
formalized by this document at the intergovernmental level. As we know 
Turkmenistan has 12 % proven natural gas resources in the world, which is 
considered essential reserves to meet current demand of Turkey for natural gas and 
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even for 500 years by itself.  Because of successful foreign policy of 
Berdymukhamedov, the investment environment developed and it increased local 
and foreign oil companies’ interests. Turkey, For Turkmenistan is a huge and rapid 
growing gas market and one reason of it is its strategic location and energy policy. 
The growing of Turkey natural gas market helped Turkey to reach a higher level of 
natural gas market in Europe. Current relations of Turkmenistan and Turkey include 
the transfer of Turkmen oil via Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to Ceyhan which 
delivering tens of thousands of Turkmen oil products to Turkish market. In January-
June 2013, around 1, 6 million tons of oil from Turkmenistan was transported via 
BTC.  The transportation of Turkmen oil via BTC pipeline began from July 2010. 
Therefore, natural gas is essential factor for Turkmenistan relations with Turkey. 
There are thousands of Turkish citizens who work in Turkmenistan, as well as 
Turkmen citizens in Turkey. The projects that are carried out by Turkey are 
equipped by Turkish equipment and materials, which directly causes to increase of 
Turkish exports. Therefore, both states get benefits from the natural gas trade and 
both states develop the regional and global security. We can claim that the relations 
between them is seen as a "win-win" situation.66 Turkmenistan can find more 
opportunities to build more democratic and pluralistic societies, to increase 
competitiveness and to integrate outside world.  It is also beneficial for Russia as 
Russia will not worry that the Central Asian areas is contested by pan- Turkic alien 
power  due to their friendly and sustainable partnership and inclusive identity 
building within which, Russia is a power.  Western powers also get benefits from 
these relations because of building sustainable economies and for not producing 
narcotics and extremists. 67 
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     Another powerful regional state is Iran and it was the only Caspian coastal state, 
which was not a part of the Soviet Union.  Iran considered Russia the biggest, the 
most powerful player in the Caucasus as it has 1002 km border with Caucasus, and 
it for its geopolitical location has always been important for Russia.  Putin build the 
strong relationship between Iran and Russia. Before, when Boris Yeltsin signed 
several arms sales agreements with Iran and Russia provided Iran with submarines, 
tanks and fighter jets. Russia began to work on main nuclear reactor of Iran. 68 
    Russian economic relations has been expanded with China and EU it also 
increased the interests of Russia to China and EU and lessened its economic 
interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This event gave opportunity to Iran to be 
more active in its trade relations with former Soviet Republics-Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Georgia and Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, in the South Caucasus. Iran also 
cooperate with Russia in the economic and security issues of the region, by the time 
does not want the heavily involvement of Russia in the Caucasus. Iran also 
benefited from its mistrust to Turkey in the region. During 2008, War between 
Russia and Georgia Iran was very active and diplomatically influenced to protect its 
own interests, economic relations, and energy routes in the region. 69 
    The relationship of Iran with Turkey is complex and by periods, it is marked as 
conflict. Turkey was one of the first states that recognized the independence of Iran 
Islamist Republic and attempted to develop the economic and energy relations with 
Iran. The energy relations between them are based on oil and natural gas. When 
moderately-Islamist, AKP party was elected in 2002 the relations became closer. 
For Iran, Turkey is serves as a route to withdraw from sanctions, and to reduce its 
isolation. However, for Turkey, Iran serves as a new market for its goods and the 
economy of Turkey based on rapidly expanding exports. However, development of 
relations between Iran and Turkey also helps to both states to cooperate against the 
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) and to protect security issues in the region. 
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However, Turkish General Staff and the Iranian military had no high- level military 
meetings.  
       The trade between Iran and Turkey has been increased rapidly to $16 billion in 
2012 and Iran became the sixth largest trading partner of Turkey. However, 
Turkey's energy imports from Iran has been decreased to 30% because of sanctions 
of EU and USA on oil and gas industry of Iran in 2012. Turkey, as USA also 
believes that Iran can obtain a nuclear weapon and it would have the negative 
consequences and instability in the region. It also would be impossible to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the region. 70 
      In the mid1990s, Iran began to open its oil and gas sectors to foreign investment. 
In 2001, July, the Supreme Energy Council was established for to oversee the 
energy sector. National Iranian Oil Company, which is responsible for all oil project 
is under the supervision of the Petroleum Ministry.  This Company also controls the 
domestic distribution networks and its subsidiary. USA policy in the Caucasus is 
opposed to Iran and it USA wants to prevent Iran from the presence in the 
transportation of energy from the region. The policy of Iran in the Caspian region is 
pragmatic and convergence with Russian interests as both countries think that the 
USA wants to marginalize their role in the transportation of Caspian energy. None 
of them wants upheaval in the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, they are also 
competitors in the Caspian region and both of them are potential corridors for 
transportation of energy of the region. 
     Iran was internationally isolated by the USA, and began fear from the dominance 
of USA in the Caspian region. Then Iran started to look at region as a new market 
for transportation its energy resources and trade goods to the region. Iranian role as 
exportation of the energy in the region is limited for some conditions. The energy 
resources are situated in the south part of the country, but the population live in the 
north part of Iran.  Turkmenistan, which is encouraged by the US as its best option, 
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is looking not Iran, but Turkey and Azerbaijan. Because, Iran's energy infrastructure 
is in the trouble.  
     Iran has friendly ties with Georgia and Armenia. Because of these friendly 
relationship and regional stability. Iran also understood its need to strength 
cooperation with regional states in the global war and terrorism issues. There is no 
common border between Iran and Georgia and that is why the relations between 
them are not in the public eye. Georgia recognize that Iran partially supports the 
regional integrity and stability. Georgia and Iran eliminated visa requirements for 
developing the Iranian tourism in Georgia in 2001. In Iran, people saw Georgia as 
the "western" country, which is easy to reach. Despite of diplomatic relations and 
high-level meetings, Iran does not rely on Georgia so much. The reason of these 
neutral relations between them is the Georgian policy, which follow pro-Western 
policy and when Saakashvili came to power, the policy of Georgia toward Iran 
began to be guided by America, but Iran favours anti-Western front in its foreign 
policy in the world. However, Georgia bought Iranian gas against of the policy and 
wishes of the USA administration, just for to reduce its energy dependence from 
Russia.  Because of USA pressure on Iran, Georgia restricts its commercial and 
strategic willingness in the relations with Iran. During war between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008 Iran was not on the side of Russia and after the war, Manouchehr 
Mottaki's, the foreign affairs minister visited to Tbilisi and stated that Iran wants 
stability in the region. 71  
      Iran and Armenia have a strong relationship, despite of that they have different 
ideology and religion, as both of them was isolated. Armenia wants to find the ways 
to survive as it has been blockade by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and Iran looks for 
partners in the world. However, Iran is sceptical of the principles of Armenia and 
unhappy with its some pro-Western policies. The cooperation between them is 
actually based on energy and trade goods and this need is based on historical 
perspective in their relations. Another reason of the close ties is the fear and rival 
relations of Iran with Turkey in the region. The anti-Iranian attitude of Azerbaijan 
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toward Iran is also other factor, which make Iran become closer with Armenia. 
During 1990s, Armenia from the region states warmly welcomed Iran and it became 
the larger trade partner of Armenia in the region and helped Armenia to mitigate the 
Azeri-Turkish embargo. In 1997, the trade partnership between Armenia and Iran 
has reached its peak but after it gradually reduced and Iran became tenth largest for 
export and eight for import partner of Armenia in 2007.  Iran is essential and 
important country for Armenian energy security. Armenia also relies on Iranian gas 
but as Russia control, the Armenian gas sector these imports end up. Since 2007 a 
gas pipeline has been operational on the Araks River, a hydropower is under the 
construction.  72 
    The relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have problems, especially the entente 
with Israel. In logically, Iran have to develop its closest bilateral relations with 
Azerbaijan. There are several aspects for that, such as: same culture, same religion 
and etc. However, their relations sometimes have undergone ups and sometimes 
downs. Iran was one of those countries, which recognized the independence of 
Azerbaijan, but, when Elçibey came to power, he accused Iran of being to oppress 
Azerbaijani minority in Iran and wanted Azerbaijani autonomy in Iran. According 
to him, Iran favored Armenia and he denounced the peace initiatives of Iran in the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  
         The leadership in the Iran is also know that the war in the Nagorno Karabakh 
will directly increase the domestic instability in Iran and cause chaos especially in 
the northern part of the region. Because more than one-third of the population living 
in this part is ethnic Azerbaijani. There are also 300 strong Armenian communities 
in this part. Because of attempts of Turkey and USA influence in the region, Iran 
had no success to mediate over Nagorno Karabakh conflict.  Because, Iran is a 
neighbor country and it has directly, strong influence over Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
which could worsened the solution process of conflict. Iran not only provided 
Armenia with its energy supplies, but also, the population of Nagorno Karabakh 
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during the most critical times, because of that, according to Azerbaijani side Iran 
cannot be considered as a guarantor of stability.  73 
      The bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Iran gradually improved under 
the presidency of Heydar Aliyev.  However, in 2001, July, warship and two jets of 
Iran attacked Azerbaijani vessel, which carried out exploration in the south part of 
Caspian. This occasion reached a new depth in the relations. There was a dispute 
between two countries over Araz in Azerbaijan and Alborz (Azerbaijani side call it 
Araz-Alov-Sharg field) in Iran, the ownership of an offshore oil fields in the 
Caspian Sea, in that year. Azerbaijan thought to develop the Araz-Alov-Sharg field 
with the assistance of foreign oil company (with British Petroleum-BP), and Iran 
wanted to prevent it. That is why Iranian navy began to force Azeri oil exploration 
ship to leave this disputed oil field. Then Iranian aircraft flew over parts of 
Azerbaijan. Iran Government evaluated the event as a minor issue, but Azerbaijani 
side considered the incident as a danger to its economic interests and territorial 
rights. For reduce the tension in the region, some developments contributed. One of 
them was Turkey's dispatch of few fighter jets to Azerbaijan for arranged air show, 
but it was a clear and direct message to defend Azerbaijan in any confrontation with 
Iran, in future. 74 The opening of gas pipeline from Iran to the Nakhchivan 
autonomous region, which has been isolated by Azerbaijan, was other attempt to 
develop bilateral relations in 2004. Azerbaijan also deliver its gas to the northern 
part of Iran.  Despite of some conflicts, today the relations seem friendly. However, 
Iran is still fear that, one day the leadership of Azerbaijan in future will change and 
the policy will be detrimental to Iranian national interests in the region. 75 
   Turkmenistan has a long border with Iran, near Mashad, its larger city. However, 
the trade relations between them are not large. Turkmenistan actively developed 
trade relations with Iran during 1940s and 50s, but Soviet Union's policy with 
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Iranian leadership was complex. In 1979, because of The Iranian Islamic revolution, 
the borders of Turkmenistan and Iran was sealed by iron curtain. Other reason of the 
complicated relations between them was the support of anti-Soviet resistance 
movement in Afghanistan by Iran in the 1980s. After 1991, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Iran and Turkmenistan established bilateral and direct diplomatic 
relations. Iran was one of the first countries, which opened its embassy in Ashgabat. 
There were three main issues in the relationships between Iran and Turkmenistan. 
First is economic cooperation, second is border delimitation of the Caspian Sea and 
third the construction of oil and gas pipelines, through the territory of Iran, from 
Central Asia to the Persian Gulf. During 1990s, Iran became Turkmenistan's third 
most important trading partner and the trade between them increased rapidly. For 
export its gas to northern Iran, Turkmenistan opened, its first new gas pipelines in 
1997, and it connected the Central Asian railway system with the network of Iran. 
However, the negotiations about a pipeline to the Persian Gulf or Turkey failed 
during 1990s. It was due to the trade sanctions of the USA, against Iran, low oil 
prices in the international oil market and the region's worsened geopolitical 
environment. 76 The President of Iran Khatami attended in the conference of the 
countries bordering on the Caspian Sea, which was sponsored by Turkmenistan in 
2002, April in Ashgabat. However, this conference did not produced any agreement, 
the leaders just discussed the raising capacity of the Korpedzhe-Kurt- Kui gas 
pipeline to 8 billion cubic meters for per year.  The construction of this pipeline date 
back to 1997 and connects South Caspian gas from Turkmenistan side to the 
northeastern provinces of Iran. The Dovietabat-Sarakhs- Khangiran, gas pipeline 
opened in 2010, January. For inauguration, Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran 
traveled to Ashgabat and met with Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov at the ceremony.  
The length of this pipeline is 182 km and it begins from the Dauletabad gas field, 
Central Asia, runs to Khangiran, Iran. While making successful relations with 
Central Asia, Iran try to make it clear that, its activities sis not contrary to third side, 
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especially to Russia. Because the mutual trust and close relations are essential for 
the security of the region as well as states. Iran has cautious policy toward Russia 
first, because of the necessity of economic relations between Russia and Central 
Asia, as the interest of these parts helps to maintaining economic relations. Second, 
because of the importance of relations with Russia as it is the main trading and 
military partner of Iran.77 Membership of Russia in the United Nation's Security 
Council makes the relations of Iran with Russia more essential.  The ownership of 
Caspian Sea resources also made these relations closer to each other.  Both Iran and 
Russia are opposed to the extensive economic presence of West in the Caucasus and 
they have common interest to receiving a share of resources of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan. Therefore, Russia remains the main factor in the relations of 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan with Iran. Now, the main ambition of Iran, besides of 
Russia, Turkey and USA, is to become the fourth regional power in the Caspian 
region and to have more influence in this region. 78  
 
3. New trends and remaining challenges in Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan bilateral 
relations 
3.1. Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan: perspectives for new areas in bilateral co-
operation. 
 
     After collapse of Soviet Union, the Caspian Region became the scene of 
international struggle. There are several problems with the cooperation of the 
region’s states. First, the region countries have some difficulties after they gained 
their independence. The GDP of these countries fell between 1989 and 1997.The 
falls were the result of military conflicts within or between the states of the region. 
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It reduced the demand for energy in the region. Second, there was a serious political 
instability in the region. Such as Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the separatist struggles 
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia and Chechnya war, civil war in Tajikistan, 
the involvement of Uzbeks in the conflict in Afghanistan. Third, the new 
independent states have political and economic dependence on their neighbours 
such as: Iran, Turkey, Russia and China. Pipelines cross some of these neighbours’ 
territories. Fourth, the USA is opposed to growing influence of Russia in the region 
and the cross of pipelines from Iranian area. 79 
   After collapse of Soviet Union, the unequal distribution of resources among states 
also increased current militarization of sea. Azerbaijan reached a 75 million dollar 
agreement with Russia in 2010 for the purchase of the “Uran-E” shipborn missile 
systems. In 2012, Azerbaijan also received more equipment and spent 1.6 billion 
dollar for purchase of arms from Israel.  Azerbaijan plans to increase its capabilities 
and deploy modern ships within the framework of a navy power modernization 
program by 2020.  Azerbaijan also developed air support capability to its fleet. 
Three major airbases of the country: Nasosnaya, Lenkoran and Qala are located on 
the Caspian coast. The militarization of the Caspian Sea caused a security dilemma 
and separate Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. IN 2010, Turkmenistan also made 79.8 
million dollar order to Russia for naval missiles “Uran-E”.  In 2012, September, 
Turkmenistan performed its first naval military exercises in the sea. The purpose 
was to prepare navy to prevent any attack on ships and oil refineries. However, it 
was evident that, Turkmenistan responded to action when patrol ship of Azerbaijan 
took “illegal action” against a civilian ship, which carried scientific research work. 
Then, Berdymukhamedov announced that Turkmenistan must protect its borders 
and even his country does not want to spend too much money to naval 
militarization, Turkmenistan want to be sure about its security. Turkmenistan was 
the only country that did not have a naval force in the Caspian Basin, however, its 
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decision to establish a naval base and coast guard in the Caspian Sea increased 
mistrust with neighbouring states. 80 
   Main reasons for cooperation are: economic goals, the primacy of security, 
Russian sensitivities and etc. Turkmenistan rapprochement with Azerbaijan will be 
beneficial for both sides by the facilitating the exploration of the southern Caspian. 
However, Russia will resist such relations. According to region policy of Russia, it 
is in Russia’s best interest to extend dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.  
Because both countries want to supply EU with oil and gas. It reduce their and EU 
dependence on Russia. The rapprochement of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in 
2008, March outbreak of fighting along Azerbaijan and Armenian ceasefire line was 
observed that, Russia warned Azerbaijan with this signal. After war with Georgia in 
2008, Russia sent a message that it is ready to defend its desire by using military 
force in the region and any pipelines cross through Georgia are within its reach. 81 
      Because of the history of littoral states’ practice in the sea, our argument that the 
sea is the common property of these states. In the beginning of 1949, the Soviet 
Union alone engaged in oil operations without consent of its southern neighbour and 
Iran because of its fear of political tensions forced Iran to be forty year silent 
regarding to Soviet oil operations and oil pollution. Now, general ecological 
situation in the region is getting worse. Because of pollution and exploration of the 
coastal shelf, Azerbaijani coastline was declared unsafe for human. Baku Bay and 
Turkmen Bays are polluted areas in the Caspian Sea. It also has no less risky for the 
construction of gas and oil pipelines in the sea.   However, the disputes among 
coastal states over access to resources is a major obstacle for effective solution of 
problems and preservation of biological resources. 82 
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    The current problem is that energy resources are far from its potential consumers 
and transcontinental pipelines. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan pay attention to 
development of energy sector and willing to continue develop traditional 
cooperation. Turkmenistan also interested in to sell is gas to Europe. As 
Turkmenistan wants to diversify its pipeline routes, being with Russia and Iran is 
not profitable for Turkmenistan.  Azerbaijan is the best alternative for that reason. 
Azerbaijan, being supplier of oil and gas, also highlighted its willingness to become 
a transit country for Turkmen and Kazakh oil and gas. Being with In 21 century, the 
development will be in three ways interactions among producing, transit and 
consumer countries. This formula will help to the solution of global problems. This 
new formula based on an equal benefit for all sides. It will also replace dangerous 
competition. The multiple pipeline infrastructure will help to create new jobs, will 
require regional cooperation and stabilize international distribution of energy 
resources. Using pipelines as a tool for own interests and political or economic 
goals must be totally eliminated. The globalization in economic world requires 
developing International Conventions, guaranteeing the functioning and treatment 
of trans–national pipelines. Turkmenistan view it as one of the important challenges 
in the 21st century. 83 The negotiations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan failed 
for several years and result of this, many projects has been lost. Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan share Caspian Sea border and cooperation is in the economic interests 
of both countries. States adopted accelerate regional stability and economic 
development models. These models undoubtedly will establish a stability in the 
region. In 2013, trade turnover between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan amounted to 
88.15 million dollar and exports from Azerbaijan to Turkmenistan amounted 39.85 
million dollar. 84 
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      Turkish government is seeking grounds for future cooperation between 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan decided to 
establish tripartite format in 2013. Turkey has great influence in Turkmenistan 
being its second biggest trading partner after China. The first meeting in trilateral 
format was held in Baku, 2014. Elmar Memmedyarov, Azerbaijan Foreign Minister 
and his counterparts adopted The Baku Declaration during meeting. According to 
this Declaration, the cooperation among three countries will cover energy industry, 
tourism, humanitarian and political sphere. Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan’s 
Foreign Ministers stressed that they will make common effort to struggle against 
terrorism, organized crime and extremism. 85 The second Trilateral Meeting of 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in 
Ashgabat in 2015, January, after first Trilateral Meeting which held in Baku 2014, 
May. In this meeting, Cavuşoğlu stated that three countries have common values 
and parties strengthen the relations. The security of energy supply and resources 
were main items on the agenda. The Ministers also discussed how to deliver 
Azerbaijani and Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey. The meeting ended with 
the signing of a joint statement on cooperation.    
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov attended the opening ceremony of the first 
European Games and met with Ilham Aliyev in 2015. President Ilham Aliyev 
welcomed Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and stressed the importance of 
friendship and development of bilateral relations. The president of Turkmenistan 
also thanked Ilham Aliyev for invitation and added common language, cultural and 
historical values and expansion of bilateral relations. The head of Turkmenistan on 
his turn invited Azerbaijani President to the 20th anniversary of the country’s 
neutrality conference, which took place in December.  
    Now, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan recognize the need of environmental 
cooperation. Uncertainty of legal status Caspian Sea is the major obstacle for 
cooperation with many areas, including preservation of the biological resources 
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protection environment and establishment of a joint monitoring group. International 
and national safety must be a key issue. EU and Turkey are trying to persuade both 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to resolve their problems and disputes and to enter a 
new era of cooperation, which will be more beneficial for other countries too. 
However, Turkmenistan does not hurry to resolve the legal dispute over Caspian 
Sea and more involved in natural gas infrastructure projects. The governments 
should do their best to maintain communication and avoid unilateral action that 
could be perceived as a risk to security of other Otherwise, Russia will tighten its 
grip on European Union gas demand and leave Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to find 
other alternatives. 86 
 
    3.2. Impact of warming relations on settlement of the Caspian Sea-related 
disputes 
 
    The Caspian Region is important because the interests of many states cross here. 
First, the states bordering Caspian Sea- Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan. Second, Central Asian States and Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine which 
oil and gas of the region is crucial for them. 87 The region faced the most 
contentious international problem by the emerging the legal status of the sea.  Now, 
there are five states bordering the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Russia. All of these states has its own resolution to the problem. 
Several confrontations took place during the ongoing disputes among five countries. 
It is because of that oil, gas pipelines have vital importance for these states, and the 
interests of big powers are intertwined here because of strategically important 
oilfield and fish stocks. The largest part of explored oil in the sea concentrated near 
the shores of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Deposits on the Russian part of the shelf 
are not developed and need further exploration. After independence, Azerbaijan 
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opened its industry to foreign investment and signed the greatest number of 
production-sharing agreements. Turkmenistan’s coast is the least well explored of 
all. Iran is least interested in the immediate development of the oil deposits in the 
Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan government adopted a ten-year development plan in 
1993, to become a “second Kuwait” but restricted foreign investment in the sector. 
These restrictions resulted a limited development in the energy resources of 
Turkmenistan. 88 
     Some analysts think that the dispute arose from the question if the Caspian Sea 
should be defined as a sea or a lake. However, it does not seem to be either of them. 
The Caspian Sea is defines as a lake because, it is not directly or indirectly 
connected to an ocean basin. Secondly, it is located 22 meters below the sea level, 
while all the other seas located at an attitude 0 or sea level.  If it is a lake, it would 
be a boundary lake and shared by the littoral states. Because of the delimiting lakes 
among littoral states practices, each coastal states should have exclusive sovereignty 
over the natural and biological resources, shipping and water surface in its national 
sector. In general, there are no internationally accepted rules for division lakes and 
more often, lakes are divided by countries on the basis of the median line, or coastal 
line without restriction for using its waters. However, according to many scientists 
the large size of the Caspian Sea is not common for lakes. Its salinity and depth 
comparable to semi-enclosed seas and has connection to the ocean, therefore it 
defined as a sea. 
    However, if it is a sea, it should apply to the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of Sea. United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) governs international 
waters. It was approved in the third United Nations Conference, 1982 and came into 
force in 1994.  The responsibilities and rights of nations in the use of the world’s 
ocean and established the way of division, exploitation of ocean resources and 
management of marine natural resources and 158 countries joined to this 
Convention. Articles 86-89, Section I, Part IV it was declared that, high seas are 
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open to all states and no state can claim to sovereignty. Coastal states have 
territorial sea, breadth not exceeding 12 miles and continental shelf. In Article 122, 
Part IX “enclosed and semi-enclosed sea” defines as a “sea which is surrounded by 
two or more states and connected to another sea or ocean by a narrow outlet” The 
basic principle definition of water as a sea is depends on its connection to an ocean 
according to Law. The Caspian Sea is 1000 miles away from ocean and does not 
had natural connection to it. However, a narrow outlet is not defined and if it natural 
geographic feature or connecting canals as the Volga-Don Canal system which 
connects the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. According to Article 123, semi-enclosed 
seas’ littoral states should cooperate with each other. International law determined 
what a semi closed sea is but left other questions to bordering states. UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea can be useful for clarifying littoral states’ rights. 
However, it similarly the analysis of the legal regime of international lakes cannot 
help to determine how boundaries should be traced. There is not a single and 
generally accepted method of delimitation, and it is up to coastal states to decide. 89 
    Azerbaijan’s position is that The Caspian Sea must be divided by “median line” 
principle. Azerbaijan also support the division of the Caspian Sea into  sectoral 
zones and claim that the inter-republic division among Azerbaijan, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan was approved by Viktor Chernomyrdin –Russian 
Prime Minister, two years after breakup of the Soviet Union, in 1993. Actually, the 
insistence of Azerbaijan to this division is based on economic, political and 
geographic considerations. First of all, the largest part of gas and oil resources 
would be situated in Azerbaijani part. Second, these resources are in the shallow 
portion of the sea and it allow easy offshore drilling. Finally, Azerbaijan being ally 
of the USA, does not want Iran to be involved in development of its Caspian Sea 
resources, as it will gain more resources in the sea than Iran. The USA supports 
Azerbaijan’s legal and political position on the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan announced 
that Russia was supporter of shared ownership and agreed the division of the seabed 
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with “median line” principle in 1998, August. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agreed 
on the division of seabed with a “median line” principle at the same year, in 
February. Iran initially rejected the “median line” method, but in 2000 agreed, 
feeling that it lacked the power to overcome the position of other states but 
indicated certain conditions, such as: Iran’s share should not be less that 20% and 
the division of the surface and of the seabed should match exactly. UNCLOS 
formed an international Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, a United Nations body with 
special expertise in sea law.  Tribunal is empowered by the Article 286 of UNCLOS 
to issue binding rulings in cases where the parties cannot settle their differences. 
     The southern part of the Caspian Sea is the deepest and contains the most 
productive, large oil and gas fields, which extends across the sea from the Absheron 
Peninsula in Azerbaijan and to Peri- Balkan Region in the western Turkmenistan.   
The Caspian problem is a priority in the politics of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. 
Relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan worsened due to disputes over 
Caspian Sea fields. 90 Then, both countries closed their embassies in 2001 and direct 
flights between two countries’ capitals were cancelled. In November 2002, Niyazov 
even accused Azerbaijan attempting assassination against him. Due to these 
tensions, new negotiations on the status of the Caspian Sea failed in Ashgabat. 
     Since 2007, oil production from Turkmenistan has increased and it is highly 
dependent on new investment and technological capacity to bring new fields on 
stream and solving disputes with Azerbaijan. There are also political aspects of the 
problem. First, Iran and Russia have a great influence over Turkmenistan as it is has 
a close economic relations with them. However involving in this dispute, being 
under pressure of Russia, is contrary to political interests of Turkmenistan. This 
disputed is the main obstacle for development of regional gas and oil projects, as 
dispute over a middle line location where majority of oil reserves are located there. 
However, can sides solve this problem? The first step towards solving the problem 
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have been taken by Azerbaijan. Because Azerbaijani side considered this problem 
created by artificial means. In 1997, Heydar Aliyev met with Saparmurat Niyazov 
and both agreed to establish a joint expert commission. Parties met at the level of 
ministries and established joint expert commission in 1998, February in Ashgabat. 
However, negotiations did not progress. Initially it was perceived that new president 
Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov would be more flexible, but an agreement has not 
been reached since then. Both states hopes to draw the line in which will benefit 
them and provide the majority of oil fields. in spite of that, Transport and energy are 
still remain the main areas of cooperation, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are ready 
to develop cooperation in the spheres of health, tourism, technology, agriculture 
research, food industry and etc. 91 
     The first Summit of the five littoral states of the Caspian Sea took place in 
Turkmenistan, in 2002, 23-24 April. The summit failed to make any important steps 
toward legal status of the sea and ended without any progress. The second Summit 
held in 2007, in Tehran and concluded with a Tehran Declaration, which was 
ratified as the first political document by the Heads of the Caspian Sea coastal 
countries. Document stated that the littoral states will make every effort to keep 
peace and stability in the region, work together for the efficient use of natural 
resources of the sea, deepen economic cooperation and agree on sailing, fishing and 
navigation rights under the flag of the littoral states until the resolution of the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea. Declaration also notes that no other countries has the right 
to deploy ships or military forces into the Caspian Sea and sea should be used only 
for peaceful matters. The leaders of the five littoral states signed an agreement on 
security cooperation at the third Summit in Baku, which held in 2010. Only the 
littoral states are responsible for the security of the sea according to this agreement. 
The reason of for this agreement was the militarization of the sea. However, this 
Summit also failed to make any progress. 
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  All five littoral states’ leaders- Vladimir Putin, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, 
Ilham Aliyev, Hassan Ruhani and Nursultan Nazarbayev attended in the fourth 
Caspian Sea Summit in Astrakhan, Russia in 2014. This meeting was more 
significant than other summits the parties agreed on some issues. Five leaders 
reviewed their commitment about keeping non-Caspian states from establishing a 
military presence in the Caspian Sea. Parties also agreed to ensure “a stable balance 
of arms in the sea” and limit military construction according to interests of all 
parties without harming the security of all.  They reached a new agreement about 
two types of maritime zones. One granted sovereignty over area out to15 nautical 
miles area beyond shores of littoral states and second delimiting exclusive fishing 
rights up to 25 nautical miles from their coasts. Customs, joint rescue missions and 
taxation also were included to their discussion. The jointly development of waters 
which extend beyond fishing zones also was agreed. States also began dispute how 
to divide the seabed. Iran, the country with the shortest coastline argued that each 
state should have an equal area in floor and surface of the Caspian Sea and major 
construction on seabed should be with the consent of all coastal states. Russia was 
favour the latter proposal because it would protect its pipelines which connect 
Central Asia and Europe and the division of seabed according to median line and to 
leave the adjacent waters open to all littoral states for common navigation. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan supported it but Iran remained opposed. In this 
occasion, Kazakhstan would receive 28.4, Azerbaijan 21, Russia 19, Turkmenistan 
18 and Iran 13.6 percent. 92 
    There is no concrete proposal which supported by more than one state now. 
According to comments of experts in international law, in the solution of legal 
disputes of the Caspian Sea, littoral states might select to employ rules should be 
relevant to international watercourses, including lakes. Thus, everything is in the 
hands of littoral states. Whether it is sea or lake, it is up to the five Caspian littoral 
states to negotiate. To reach an agreement among littoral states is difficult because 
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of the fact that the sub-soil resources unevenly distributed and states will not get 
benefit equally.  93 
      Now, all the littoral states are favour to sectoral division of seabed. 
Nevertheless, there are still some issues that need to be discussed.  The discussions 
will last as long as the parties make an agreement. The question is if seabed should 
be divided or how the division must be accomplished. If the past of Sea guide to its 
future we can easily predict that the seabed division will not be so much determined 
by littoral states’ legal arguments as by geostrategic and political concerns. A “great 
game” with its new rules and different players is expected spectacle because of the 
importance of the Caspian energy resources. 94 As a final point, many maritime 
boundaries are unsettled because of long disputes. Many questions remain 
uncertain, as political issues will exist in this situation. The solution is either 
negotiation or third party intervention. It is important for littoral states to sign 
multilateral convention. 95 
 
Conclusion 
      Bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are still in transition. 
Lack of clarity in the legal status of the Caspian Sea and continuing geopolitical 
games over the energy pipelines will continue shaping relations between these two 
countries. However, one is clear that existing challenges have negative impact on 
political and economic dimensions of Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan ties. 96 
     Roots of the disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on Caspian legal 
status began in 1997, with the interview, in which the President of Turkmenistan, 
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Saparmurad Niyazov claimed that Azeri oil field was situated in Turkmen territorial 
water and belonged to his country. Turkmenistan protested over Azerbaijani 
development plans on Azeri and Chirag oil fields and accused Azerbaijan for illegal 
exploitation of two oil fields. He also warned to sue the oil companies, which 
involved in this process. Then, attention shifted to dispute over Kapaz field.   
Russian Companies Lukoil and Rosneft withdraw from the project of development 
in Kapaz oilfield by the pressure of Turkmenistan at the same time.  
   Then Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov claimed that former Soviet 
Ministry for the Oil industry divided the Caspian into sectors in 1970, assigning to 
each of the littoral Soviet states. It was done by using something “called middle line 
method.” Azeri field with Chirag and Guneshli covered by the “Contract of 
Century,” which was signed between eleven foreign companies and Azerbaijan in 
1994, September. They were explored by Azerbaijani geologists since 1970s and 
Azerbaijan logically has ownership right to fields for historical reasons. 97 It will be 
clear that Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan dispute over oilfields will have an impact 
on future delimitation of the Caspian Sea. The latest bilateral tension began after 
announcement of Turkmenistan’s plan to start geological sampling at the Kyapaz 
field. Azerbaijani side claimed that it violates a 2008 bilateral agreement.  This 
dispute raises different problems on main areas of international law such as: Law of 
the sea, law of treaties, environmental law, territorial sovereignty, state succession 
and state sovereignty. 98 
    Caspian Sea region is strategically and politically sensitive. It is a fact that, the 
region players each has different preferences based on their individual rationality 
combines to make for complex negotiations.  Russian factor, because of its 
important geopolitical role cannot be excluded from this process. Russia has a great 
influence on the negotiations process between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and 
their relations with Western countries. When Putin came to power, the Caspian Sea 
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had become one of the priorities in his foreign policy. Some analysts even think that 
Russia has a hand over dispute. Turkmenistan’s actions were mostly encouraged 
and pushed by Russia. Moscow has strong dominance over Turkmenistan because 
of historical dynamics, instrument and geographical reasons. The claim on fields by 
Turkmenistan side overlap with the project on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 
came to forefront. Russia is not in favour of transportation of Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan’s oil and gas resources to Europe through alternative routes and 
continues its policy in order to monopolize this field and subordinate transportation 
routes to its network. Thus, it is in Russian’s best interest to extent the dispute 
between two countries further and the both states should not wait its help as a 
mediator.  99 
    Iran being an important international actor also has a crucial role as a littoral state 
on the region. It has borders and extensive trade links with both Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan and at the same time tries to maintain good relations with Russia. Iran 
does not want any issues in the Caspian Sea to be resolved bilaterally without 
consent of all littoral states. Together with Russia, Iran have common interest in 
prevention of Turkic-speaking countries’ dominance and alliance in the region. 100 
However, the recent developments related to the Iranian nuclear programme and 
following rapprochement between Iran and the United States, the US and the EU-
supported sanctions against Russia and the following drop in oil prices, as well as 
worsening situation in the Middle East make situation further complicated. 101 It is 
most likely that the above-mentioned developments will have influence on political 
and economic developments in the Caspian region, which consequently could 
influence bilateral relations, including between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The 
interest of Turkey in the region is political and economic. Turkey wants to continue 
its important role in the extraction of Azerbaijan’s oil to the West. Being oil transit 
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country, Turkey reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Turkey also 
interested in the development of Caspian markets for its industrial goods. Turkey 
can feel both countries’ needs better than others because this country has close 
historic, cultural, ethnic and political ties with both states. Thus, Turkey can be a 
mediator between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan 102 
    Recent steps indicate that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are keen on to expand 
political and economic ties. They are no longer represented by the USSR and each 
of them has its own rule, government. The relations of two countries were 
unfriendly and hostile for a long time. There is a great potential for investment 
opportunities in the region. Economic cooperation has the key role in solving 
disputes. In this way, oil and pipelines from the Caspian could be a source of both 
reconciliation and prosperity. In the current regional scenario, the problem of the 
disputed fields between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan has no win-win solution. It is 
also clear that the conflict must be resolved as soon as possible. Baku and Ashgabat 
should negotiate themselves, without outside interference. This is an important 
period in history. If countries cannot solve it by bilateral talks, it is better to appeal 
to international arbitration, than to block cooperation, endlessly keeping the 
problem unresolved and to harm bilateral relations. Otherwise, the problem of the 
disputed fields can accelerate arms build-up in the Caspian Sea not only by the 
disputing parties, but also by other regional players.  103 
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